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601 *The Shape of Things*

A MAJOR CABINET SHUFFLE, THE FIRST IN ten years of Roosevelt's Administration, is at least a possibility as we go to press. The plan calls for Secretary of the Interior Ickes to head a revitalized Labor Department, enlarged by the inclusion of the man-power program within its jurisdiction. With the disappearance of the independent War Manpower Commission, Paul V. McNutt would succeed Ickes in the Interior Department and Frances Perkins would take over the Federal Security Administration. The two main divisions of organized labor, as well as the chairmen of the five Congressional committees working on man-power legislation, support the proposed shift, which would satisfactorily settle a number of pressing problems. The man-power program should from the start have had the advantages of an established agency headed by an official of Cabinet rank. The President obviously did not feel that Secretary Perkins could cope with the task—one of the most exacting in the whole war effort—and improvised the new agency out of sheer reluctance to part with her services. This duplication in agencies has become a common device in Washington, and while it has its diplomatic uses it does not make for administrative efficiency. If the man-power program is to be rescued from the threat of military control, and if it is to be conducted with an eye to its far-reaching social implications, it should be headed by a Cabinet member who is also a fighter, a thinker, and a good administrator. Harold Ickes answers the specifications better than any other man in Washington. If necessary, he should be drafted.

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THE UNITED NATIONS ARE ENJOYING THE refreshing experience of offensive action on all fronts, but optimism is only justified so long as it acts as a spur to greater effort. In Russia the ability of the Red Army to seize the initiative in two widely separated sectors, after standing up to heavy punishment all the summer, is truly impressive. It must be remembered, however, that the elasticity of defense afforded by the vast Russian spaces is now benefiting the Germans, and that recapture of territory is not decisive in itself. To some extent the advances of the Red Army may have been facilitated

by Nazi withdrawals to prepared winter positions. Last year's bitter experiences have probably enabled the Germans to make better preparations for sub-zero warfare this time, and the Red Army is likely to find itself tested by a perfected "porcupine" defense system. On the other hand, this year Hitler has another front to worry about—a front, too, making heavy demands on his air transport, which played so important a part on the eastern front last winter. Reports from Africa are encouraging, but again the achievement of immediate objectives will not necessarily produce decisive effects. Tunis may well have fallen by the time this issue appears; Bizerte will almost certainly prove a tougher nut to crack. And while the Axis forces fight a delaying action there we must expect Hitler to make an effort to regain the initiative. Where is he likely to strike? A winter campaign in Turkey seems improbable; an air-borne attack on Syria would require a heavy drain on the overworked *Luftwaffe*. The omens, therefore, point toward Spain, torn between its fascist obligations and its fears of Allied victory.

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WITH THE SHIFT IN THE TIDE OF BATTLE have come the first responsible, if tentative, gropings toward the peace. In Toronto Wendell Willkie hurled the challenge: "We cannot fight this war in silence, whatever our experts say. Because if we fight in silence, those same experts in the end, even winning the war, win nothing but blood and ashes." And in London Winston Churchill picked up the gage: "Certainly the most painful experiences would lie before us . . . if we fell to quarreling about what we should do with our victory before that victory had been won." But these were only the outside limits of the debaters' respective positions. Within them the protagonists edged cautiously toward an area of compromise. Willkie conceded the existence of "details which cannot be judiciously worked out under the pressure of war," and asked only that we "know what our line of solution will be." This seems to us a far greater concession than Mr. Churchill's. The British Prime Minister merely hazarded the guess that the war in Europe would come to an end before the war in Asia and suggested that while Britain and the United States then proceeded to finish off Japan, they could at the same time, and in conjunction with the other United Nations, be "shaping the international instruments and national settlements" of a free Europe. We are glad to hear Mr. Churchill use such terminology, at least with respect to Europe, but presumably he would leave the shaping of instruments and settlements for a free Asia until the end of the struggle against Japan. In that case peace plans for both Asia and Europe would have waited on the cessation of hostilities. We believe with Mr. Willkie that we can win in the future peace only what we consciously set out to win in the war. We hope President Roosevelt

shares this view and that he will not much longer allow himself to be outdistanced by his Republican critic in this vital area of discussion.

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IF CHURCHILL'S SPEECH HEDGED ON THE peace, it was both ringing and realistic with regard to the war. For anyone who is inclined to sit back and breathe easy we prescribe the sentence: "I know of nothing that has happened yet which justifies the hope that the war will not be long or that bitter and bloody years do not lie ahead." Despite this brake on runaway optimism, the speech was buoyant in tone and frank in its outline of things to come. Africa is not to be regarded as a stable front, but merely as a "springboard." Italy is to feel the full brunt of the United Nations' air power, which already far exceeds that of the Axis—unless its people contrive to rid themselves of the regime that has brought them only "measureless calamities." What has already happened to Genoa, Turin, and Milan "is only a foretaste." Even while Churchill spoke, Turin was being blasted by four-ton bombs and a hundred thousand incendiaries. Nevertheless, Italy's elimination from the war would seem to be a long way off, not because of what the Italian radio describes as the "stoic calm" of its people, but because Italy is already an occupied country. Since November 15 five German divisions have streamed through the Brenner Pass, and the total strength of the occupying force is now reliably estimated at 300,000 men, not counting some 90,000 Gestapo agents and civil administrators.

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THE PRESIDENT'S REQUEST FOR EMERGENCY powers to suspend any provisions of the tariff and immigration acts that interfere with effective prosecution of the war has met with unjustifiable delay in both the House and the Senate. No one seems to question the necessity for prompt action in giving the President power to conclude special trade agreements with Latin America to speed the delivery of vital war materials or in cutting down the red tape in admitting foreign troops or persons engaged in behind-the-lines activities against the Axis in Europe, Asia, or Africa. But there is a substantial minority in Congress which is opposed to giving the Chief Executive additional war-time powers as a matter of "principle," regardless of the war. *Newsweek* points out, moreover, that behind the scenes "the ugly truth is that anti-Semitism was a definite factor in the bitter opposition to the President's request." Some House members have expressed fear of a large influx of refugees from Europe. It is unlikely that the President, in view of the State Department's notorious reluctance to facilitate the escape of European refugees, has any intention of pushing the door wide open, but it would be folly not to avail ourselves of the knowledge and experience of the

men and women who have risked their lives fighting Hitler within Europe, and it would be inhuman not to give them sanctuary.

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WE BELIEVE THAT CIVILIAN CONTROL OF the war program must be maintained for sound social reasons as well as for reasons of efficiency; but the civilians who run war-production agencies must inspire confidence, and we find it easy to understand why the armed forces are hostile to the WPB under Donald M. Nelson. Like its predecessors, the WPB has never had any real influence over procurement, although there were areas in which it had both power and responsibility—in the curtailment of civilian output, conversion to war production, and the rationalization of production to insure maximum results—and in each of these fields the steps taken by the WPB were belated and inadequate. The record of the armed services in their own sphere is no better. The bungling of priorities by the Army and Navy Munitions Board is one example of their inefficiency; another is the chaotic situation in production scheduling. The armed services ought not to be burdened with the problems of industrial mobilization. But they will be doubly reluctant to give up their powers over procurement until we have civilian agencies that can deliver the goods. The struggle between military and civilian agencies dramatizes the need for passage of the Pepper-Tolan-Kilgore War Mobilization bill. Nelson may swing to support of the bill in the hope of emerging as head of the civilian supply ministry it proposes to establish. It would be a pity if the kite of so poor a candidate were to be tied to so excellent a bill. Nelson must be supported in his attempt to establish civilian control, but the fact that he is on the right side in this dispute ought not to distract attention from the fact that in failing to do a good job he has given the military a strong argument.

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ALTHOUGH THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAID formally on November 23 that the question of Martinique and other French possessions in the Caribbean had been settled by an agreement with Admiral Georges Robert, the Martinique radio continues to send out pro-Axis propaganda. On November 26 it used a dispatch from Tangier painting this gloomy picture of the situation in Algiers following the American occupation: "Algiers finds itself in the midst of an economic, military, financial, political, and social crisis. The port is almost entirely destroyed. . . . There is no more train service. . . . The markets have no food to sell, the stores are empty. Two young naval officers were executed for an attempt to kill General Giraud. . . . Many persons have been sent to concentration camps. . . ." On the same broadcast a Bordeaux item quoted a Moslem spokesman as exposing "the leading part played by the Jews in the treason of the principal leaders who were charged with

the defense of the empire." Said he, "North Africans now turn to France for aid from a legion of patriots [Laval's African Phalanx] who will free them from the yoke of foreign domination." Will such obviously Nazi-dictated "news" continue to be broadcast to the French Antilles, Guiana, and Haiti with the tacit approval of the State Department?

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GASOLINE RATIONING HAS BECOME effective throughout the country, despite the ill-considered efforts of a Congressional minority to block it. Rubber Director Jeffers, Price Administrator Henderson, and the President deserve credit for standing firm in the face of unsavory political pressure from the anti-rationing group. Henderson in particular has been singled out for Congressional attack because he had the courage to put the country's interests ahead of short-time political considerations. The attitude of the Middle West Congressmen is difficult to understand in view of the fact that their constituents, and the American people as a whole, have accepted gasoline rationing as being in their own interest. And while a few persons may have felt that they were already being as careful as possible in the use of their tires, these same persons are likely to be pleasantly surprised at the further savings made under gasoline rationing. In the East, where the amount of gasoline available for an A coupon has recently been cut from four to three gallons, the only complaints are against loopholes that permit a small minority to abuse their privileges.

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A BRITISH SEA CAPTAIN MUST "NEVER NEVER swear with a *d*," according to the Hays office, which is seeking to purify the British moving picture "In Which We Serve," due for release shortly. Some of *The Nation's* editors have had the privilege of attending a preview of this film, and they can testify emphatically that this is a case where Mr. Hays should forget his shears. "In Which We Serve" is the story of a heroine—a British destroyer—and some 200 heroes—her crew. Although fictional in form, it is essentially a documentary picture, giving a grimly realistic account of the life of a fighting navy in which a sprinkling of the milder sailor oaths figures quite naturally. But it is ridiculous even to raise irrelevant charges of blasphemy about a work of art which, more than any other war film we have seen, provides a deep emotional experience. We associate Noel Coward, who in addition to writing the dialogue, composing the music, and directing, plays the chief role, with more frivolous themes, but on this occasion he has dedicated his technical brilliance to the service of democracy. He plays the part of the captain superbly, but his emphasis is not on the individual but on the democratically led team—the force which is going to break the totalitarian team. This picture should help to dispel the illusion fostered by our enemies that our British comrades-in-

arms are spiritless proletarians officered by simpering aristocrats. Any interference with its showing would be sabotage.

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A YEAR AND A HALF AGO THE PRESIDENT set up the Committee on Fair Employment Practices and charged it with investigating discrimination in war industries. Its authority was limited by its inability to punish offenders, but it carried the prestige of the President's name, and it did as good a job as could be expected under the circumstances. When the War Manpower Commission was created last summer, however, the CFEP was made responsible to Paul V. McNutt, who does not seem greatly interested in that phase of the manpower problem. According to A. Philip Randolph, no agency is now doing anything effective to check discrimination, which is consequently on the increase. The CFEP has had to wait four months for action to be taken on a small appropriation. And now that it has funds, it is in the difficult position of having to investigate an agency of which it is a part, since the McNutt office, or any that supersedes it, will direct employment policy for all war industry. It would seem necessary, as Mr. Randolph says, to restore the CFEP to independent status and to strengthen it.

France After Toulon

SUNK beneath the waters of Toulon Harbor, along with the French navy, is a myth that bedeviled our foreign policy for more than two years—the myth that it was necessary for the United States to play ball with Vichy in order to keep the French fleet out of Hitler's hands. We know now that orders to destroy the ships rather than let them be employed to fight for the Axis were issued when France fell. It was the only order that could have been given, for if the majority of French naval officers were bitterly anti-British, the rank and file were no less anti-German. Thus the fleet could not be used by either side; it could only fight if attacked and commit suicide if its position became hopeless.

In the meantime, however, it was valuable as a phony trump card in the Vichy hand. It could be used against the Germans in an attempt to make "collaboration" a little more a matter of partnership, a little less a state of vassalage. It could be used against the British and Americans as a threat to tilt the scales of sea power in the Mediterranean against them. Once North Africa was invaded, with the support of an Allied armada strong enough to overwhelm the French fleet, the game was up. Darlan knew it and ratted. Hitler knew it and postponed his occupation of Toulon only long enough to complete his arrangements to prevent all possibilities of flight. Suicide was the only way out, and the French sailors faced that bitter fact calmly and courageously.

With its fleet sunk, its army disbanded, and the whole country occupied, the Vichy regime has lost the last shreds of legitimacy. The whole administrative structure of France is disintegrating visibly. While Laval's special police carry out the orders of the Gestapo, the army is melting away without waiting to be demobilized, and civil officials are leaving their posts. Laval stands revealed as a complete Quisling, shaking in his shoes for fear the Nazis will hold him responsible for their disappointment at Toulon. Pétain, the toothless symbol, seems more likely to be retained on his shadow throne. So long as Darlan professes to rule Africa in his name, he has some value as a political pawn whose name can be used to promote disunity and foster confusion among the French people.

Darlan's own position has perhaps been weakened by the scuttling, since his alleged influence over the fleet proved powerless to persuade it to attempt a break from Toulon. But by virtue of our support he is consolidating his hold on North Africa as head of the civil administration and chief of the French armed forces. The French have a saying that there is nothing so lasting as the provisional, and the De Gaullists' fears that Darlan will prove hard to shift if he is allowed to dig in are far from baseless.

It is reported from London that General de Gaulle himself wishes to come to Washington for a frank discussion of the whole situation. We hope that no obstacles will be put in his way and that mean attempts which are being made in some quarters to belittle his status and influence will be silenced. We are aware that De Gaulle has at times proved a prickly ally and that some of his political judgments are questionable. The fact remains that he risked all by repudiating the armistice with Germany and raising the banner of Fighting France. He has brought to our side many French colonies which have proved immensely valuable to the war effort; he has attracted to his committee representatives of all parties in France; he has become the symbol of resistance to the Axis among democratic Frenchmen everywhere. Maybe these facts do not establish his "legitimacy" in the eyes of the State Department, but his claims to represent France are certainly more valid than those of Darlan, the repudiated heir of an illegitimate sovereign.

Our action in adopting Darlan was, it is said, based entirely on military considerations and has justified itself in those terms. Perhaps so, but we do not purge that action of political significance by professing lack of interest in French politics; nor can we rid ourselves of responsibility for its results. For willy-nilly we must intervene in politics when we choose our collaborators, today in North Africa, tomorrow in Italy. By accepting Darlan's price for a cease-firing order, the weight of American support was thrown to the reactionary group he represents—to the men whose cry was "Rather Hitler

than Blum," to the small but powerful faction who sold France, hoping to keep their great possessions.

We cannot in this manner promote unity among the French; rather we insure the outbreak of civil war when the Axis is overthrown. As Walter Lippmann pointed out recently, we must be prepared "to choose correctly and swiftly, as territories are liberated, the authority which the great powers will back to restore order and negotiate the peace." In making these choices, he continues, "what we have to build on are those elements in each country who have proved by their actions that they have the character and strength to remain true to their country's institutions and to its engagements, and to have cared more for honor and loyalty and freedom than for their lives and their fortunes." If we are to adopt this farsighted principle, we shall have to find means of scuttling Darlan.

Is China Forgotten?

THE recent victories in the Solomons and the gradual progress of Australian and American soldiers against the Japanese base at Buna in New Guinea have made a good many of us optimistic about the war in the Pacific. For months Japanese troops have been held to a standstill along the vast Pacific front. In the past few weeks they have been forced back. This turn in the tide in the Pacific, coupled with the dramatic developments in North Africa and Russia, have all but convinced the man on the street that victory is just around the corner.

A realistic appraisal of the situation in the Pacific is, however, by no means so encouraging. When the Allied gains in the Solomons and New Guinea, achieved after months of fighting and at great cost, are viewed in relation to the tremendous areas overrun by the Japanese in the first few months of the war, they appear wholly insignificant. At the rate that progress is being made in the island-by-island campaign of reconquest, the war could last for decades, and there would be little hope that any of us now alive would see the liberation of the Philippines. To make matters worse, the Japanese are threatening a drive on Yunnan province in southwestern China which, if successful, would cut China off completely from the rest of the United Nations and probably result in its being forced out of the war.

Most military strategists recognize that the only way that Japan can possibly be defeated is by combined land and air operations from China. Undoubtedly our own High Command shares this view. Last week a dispatch from China quoted General Chennault as declaring that preparations have been under way for such operations for months. A great new airport is said to have been prepared—possibly one of those regained from the Japanese in August—for a direct attack on Japan. But the fact

remains that China has received very little in the way of air support from the United States; the few planes sent seem to have been largely of obsolete types. There have been no reports of the delivery of Flying Fortresses or other heavy bombers, although these are the types that could most easily be sent in from India. The remarkable achievements of the Flying Tigers and their successors in the American air force show what might be done if planes were rushed to China as they were to Australia or the Solomons. That they have not been sent on anything like a comparable scale cannot be attributed to the lack of importance of the Chinese front. Nor can it be blamed wholly on transport difficulties. Months elapsed after the outbreak of the war before the Burma road was closed. During that period planes were sent in vast numbers to almost every place but China. Moreover, many experts believe that if half the forces which were sent to Australia and New Zealand had been used in Burma, that country might have held and the transportation of supplies to China would not present the difficulties that it does today. Under the circumstances the Chinese cannot be blamed for wondering whether the color of their skin rather than strategic considerations was the chief factor in the decision to defend Australia at the expense of China, and whether that same factor did not influence the decision to launch offensives in the Solomons and New Guinea rather than an early drive to retake Burma.

The recent arrival of Mme Chiang Kai-shek in this country is in all probability a reflection of concern over the present situation. The Chinese have long been adroit in combining politics and medical attention. Civilian morale in Free China is said to be lower than at any other time during the war. The food situation is extremely bad and has been aggravated by graft and speculation among officials. Leaders of known pro-Axis sympathies have taken advantage of the widespread disillusionment with Great Britain and the United States to press home a campaign against the pro-democratic elements within the government. It would be easy to overemphasize this trend. The situation is by no means hopeless. Cable reports indicate that the recent American naval victories in the Solomons and the successes in North Africa have had a tonic effect on Chinese public opinion. But they probably have only deepened the feeling that China is being treated as the country cousin among the United Nations. This feeling could be quickly counteracted by an offensive in Burma designed to reestablish an effective supply route between China and the Western world. But American prestige in Asia will be hopelessly shattered if we continue to devote our efforts exclusively to the recapture of a few minor Japanese bases in the South Pacific and allow our last tie with China to be severed by a Japanese offensive launched from Burma.

Reunion Far from Vienna

IF THE farce of Otto had been invented by a master ironist it could not have exposed more effectively the dangers and confusions that lurk behind our government's appeasement policy. Just to recall the outline of the plot is to sense both its comic qualities and its sinister implications.

Our readers will remember the beginning of the story. An article by Freda Kirchwey published on October 24 disclosed the Hapsburg Archduke's plan to create a "Free" Austrian Legion to be headed by himself, and reported that informed persons believed the idea would "soon receive some sort of 'unofficial' approval in official Washington." The article went on to point out that "any indorsement of Otto—open or sub rosa—would be taken as an unfriendly act" by most of the governments-in-exile, especially those that once bore the Hapsburg yoke and including several of our fighting allies. This fact, the article concluded, is one that "should be considered by the pragmatists of the State Department before they decide on the resurrection of the Hapsburg dynasty."

Why should officials bother to deny facts which events are about to substantiate? A few days after the article appeared, a letter was addressed to its author by a busy official of high rank in Washington. Since it was marked "personal," its source will not be revealed here. Nor will the text be reproduced except for a few words which contribute to the humor and meaning of the story. Said the official, himself falling into the mood of irony: "In the same issue . . . you intimate that the State Department is backing a Hapsburg restoration! I have no objection to imaginative fiction; but circulation of it as news is rightly regarded as dishonorable." The official is known as a solemn fellow, and he may be excused for building a "restoration" out of the "resurrection" suggested by Miss Kirchwey. But since her comments were directed at the approval apparently about to be given Otto's plan for a legion, the story could hardly be dismissed as fiction.

For the plan devised by Otto and his monarchist followers *did* meet with favor in both the War and the State Department. And when the army decided to form an Austrian battalion, Otto's "military committee" was solemnly authorized in a letter from the Secretary of War to act as the official recruiting agency. That Mr. Stimson acted without any clear realization of political consequences is easy to believe. It is impossible to believe that the State Department was equally innocent. And the letter from Mr. Stimson—addressed to "Otto of Austria," as though the Archduke were, in fact, the ruler of his great-grand-uncle's unhappy empire—was approved by the State Department before it was dispatched.

The climax of the farce takes place in the Archduke's suite in Essex House in New York City. The occasion is the Pretender's birthday; he is thirty. Around him are gathered his retinue, his lesser followers, and American hangers-on of royalty in exile. There are uniforms and medals. Toasts are drunk. (Remember the grand reception in "Reunion in Vienna"?) The future has suddenly begun to look more hopeful—nearer. For Otto, who has never for a moment accepted as permanent the collapse of the empire or the loss of the throne that would have been his if war and republicanism and dictators had not stood in his way—Otto read to the assembled guests the document which was his best birthday present, the letter from Secretary of War Stimson accepting his services in building the Free Austrian battalion.

No wonder Otto's ambitions soared above the paltry handful of Austrian monarchists who might enlist at his call. The statement he gave to the press describing his plans spoke of "10,000,000 Americans of Austrian descent" from whom recruits could be drawn, a figure which clearly included Americans of Yugoslav, Polish, Czech, Slovak, Hungarian, and Rumanian descent, numbering several million human beings whose countries repudiated Otto's family forever at just about the time Otto was celebrating his sixth birthday.

Poor Mr. Stimson, in indorsing Otto, had picked up a red-hot issue that he could easily have avoided. Protests came pouring in, as we had not too cleverly foreseen. Every ministry of every recognized succession state wanted to know the reason for this official collaboration with the Austrian monarchists. Every unrecognized free group from Central and Southern Europe protested. Mr. Hull, in a press conference, said Otto was only a refugee. But the State Department's approval of the Stimson letter robbed that brush-off of its intended effect.

And the sad part of it all is that no practical purpose whatever, no higher "expediency," was served by extending favors to the Archduke. For essentially Mr. Hull is right. Otto is just a refugee. He is not a leader, for he has no popular following. He was brought up in exile and so has shared none of his country's bitter vicissitudes. He is a monarchist and the aspirant to a throne that will never be restored. He is considered a symbol of "reaction and darkness," as a Yugoslav official expressed it, by every state that emerged from the demise of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Darlan at least had influence with Vichy officials and generals in North Africa. He was supposed to have power to command the French fleet. But Otto is all liability. And any favors shown him are interpreted in just one way by democratic public opinion; they are interpreted as another and even less excusable sign that some of our responsible officials, however violently they may deny it, are irresistibly attracted to representatives of upper-class reaction—preferably with clerical leanings.

Brass-Hat Production

BY I. F. STONE

Washington, November 29

AS THIS is being written, the undercover struggle between military and civilian agencies for control of the war program is in the open again. Before the article appears, there will have been important announcements. The fighting is on two fronts. One is man-power; the other is production scheduling. I can offer some background observations which may help the reader to judge pending changes. These observations represent the sum total of talks with many officials.

1. The problem of man-power is somewhat simpler than that of production scheduling. The armed services, through Selective Service and enlistments, have grabbed man-power recklessly. Little thought has been given to the question of deferments, which are still regarded as somehow unpatriotic, although a skilled worker may be more useful at his machine than in uniform. There has been little planned training of replacements. Selective Service must be brought under civilian control. Any solution that compromises this basic point will prove to be no solution at all.

2. The man-power chief must be fighter enough to stand up and slug it out with the armed services. He must be satisfactory to labor, for an anti-labor man-power chief would be an unbearable irritant. Secretary Ickes, who has been offered the job, fills the bill on both scores, but it is not certain that he will take it. The Department of the Interior means a great deal to him. For at least two years he has been thinking of the contribution he might make to the war effort if the department were allowed to work on ways to expand the production of all mineral raw materials.

3. The problem of materials is more important than either man-power or production scheduling. Ferdinand Eberstadt, the WPB vice-chairman in charge of materials and the army's candidate to succeed Nelson, approaches the problem as a banker approaches a receivership. He sees his task as one of cutting down claims, pro rata, to assets. The "assets" are what his materials branches tell him is the maximum possible output of steel, copper, and aluminum. Eberstadt's method is to cut the war-production program down to fit. There is some indication that the process of reduction has gone farther than necessary; trade journals are talking of more steel for civilian business while the WPB shuts down on power projects, tank arsenals, and armorplate pools. Eberstadt's basic estimates come from materials branches dominated by the big concerns and monopolies in their respective

fields. These companies are restrained in their pioneering; new methods may easily upset old investments. There is need for an independent metals and minerals administrator to develop new ways of getting more aluminum, magnesium, copper, iron, and steel. This idea is already bubbling in Congress and helps explain the reluctance of Ickes to take the labor-man-power post.

4. Production scheduling is necessary if there is to be effective control of materials. This means scheduling the output of planes, tanks, and other armament so that parts and gadgets come along the national assembly line at the right time and in the right quantities. Neither a plane nor a tank can be used until it is complete, though it may serve to pad production figures in the meantime. At the same time there is no sense in making 10,000 of one particular part of a plane if you plan to assemble only 2,000 planes. Synchronizing the flow of parts and components is not an easy job because rates of production tend to change unevenly. The British (civilian-controlled) Ministry of Supply has done an incomparably better job on this than our army.

5. Vice-Chairman C. E. Wilson, who is theoretically but not actually in charge of production, wants to take over production scheduling. Wilson is an able, progressive business man. Nelson, after many fits and starts, is backing him, but may relapse into compromise at any time. Here we have a typical civilian-military clash. What does it mean? The "military" is made up of big business men in uniform plus professional military men. The civilians are big business men plus a leavening of public servants and New Dealers. The latter combination is a little more efficient in this field than the former, and more susceptible to public pressure. From all I can learn, the armed services have been very sloppy as industrial managers, and able business men in uniform are often bulldozed by the brass hats. This is true in aircraft. In addition, in the matter of production scheduling the profit motive may run counter to efficiency in a war program. In a private business, if one produces 1,000 bumpers for only 500 cars, waste eats profit. But in a war it may be more profitable to keep on pouring out easily made gadgets and articles even though production is thereby unbalanced. The automobile industry shows this in its fondness for making trucks and jeeps. We probably have enough of both for several second fronts.

6. If the military win the production-scheduling fight, they win. If the civilians win, they still have a long way

to go. Production schedules cannot be rationalized without canceling some contracts, modifying others. But so long as the armed services sign the procurement contracts and checks, so long as the procurement power rests in their hands, theirs is the final control of war production and scheduling, whatever victories are won on paper by the civilians. This was demonstrated under the OPM when there were civilian tank and ordnance branches. Civilian and military instructions to contractors often clashed, and the latter were obeyed because the manufacturer was dependent on the military for payment and further contracts. I have recently had an opportunity to examine records which show how often the orders of the WPB's top committees and executives are ignored by its industry branches. How much more difficult for Nelson or Wilson to get their orders obeyed by men in uniform whom they have no power to reward or punish!

7. The President gave Nelson general power over procurement and production scheduling in the executive order establishing the WPB. Within a few weeks Nelson

signed these powers away and gave them back to the army. Now he wants to assume them again, but the President, though Commander-in-Chief, may hesitate fully to support him against the wishes of the armed services. For army-navy power over procurement stems from appropriation acts of Congress, and Congress might cause trouble.

8. The drift is toward further compromise. We may muddle through on the basis of the temporary improvements possible through a Cabinet shift and another patchwork agreement between military and civilian agencies. But such changes cannot provide a real overhauling of the war-production setup. The only change that will make a fundamental difference is one that will give us unity of command on the home front, coordinated civilian control of man-power and procurement, action to break the restrictions imposed on the output of materials by monopoly and conventional thinking, and democratic leavening of the war bureaucracy which must carry out the orders.

Dry Rot and New Life in Britain

BY TOM WINTRINGHAM

London, November 16

THE defeat of General Rommel and the landing of American troops in North Africa will have a powerful effect on British politics. These military events set directly before us the problems of a European revolution against fascism and therefore the question of war aims, of what sort of world we are asking the people of Europe to join with us in building. Is it to be the kind of world we know—empire and unemployment, the rivalry of great monopolies and the clash of nations that will not yield any of their sovereign powers? Or is it to be a world of economic, ethnic, and educational democracy?

In my view the political struggle over these questions now released in Britain will not be resolved by British action alone; it will be resolved only if the forces leading the left in Britain link up with representatives of the peoples of America, Russia, India, and China. The United Nations can become really united only through a liberating revolution; for that revolution they need a new International.

The defeat of Rommel and the American invasion gave the British people almost their first taste of victory in this war. We might have expected as a result a feeling of satisfaction, a strengthening of the prestige of the Churchill government. In fact there are few signs of this; rather there are signs of the opposite, that a taste of

success may release the deep dissatisfaction of the bulk of the working and middle classes in this country. Any expression of that dissatisfaction in the political field has been held in check by a very real fear that disunity in Britain might lead to Hitler's victory. It is true that some of the critics of the government are silent now, or are even attempting to climb on the bandwagon. But these are critics from the conservative right or center, whose alliance with critics of the left in the House of Commons or in the press has made it difficult for the left critics to gain a national hearing or position. After Tobruk fell, in June of this year, the motion of censure for the government was moved and seconded by Tory critics of this sort, and the main feeling of the nation was that there would be no point in destroying Mr. Churchill's government only to put this motley crew in power.

Opposition to Mr. Churchill's government from individuals of the right has now largely disappeared. But if the feeling in the country is to have expression, a much stronger opposition from the left must appear. It will concern itself not only with war aims, the European revolution, Indian independence, and a closer unity of British policy with that of the other United Nations, but also with the key questions of post-war policy—nationalization, social security, and the like. This opposition from the left will face three main problems. The first is how to carry on effective political activity of any sort in a

country living under our war conditions. The second is how to get that political activity reflected in a Parliament for which no general elections are held. The third, and perhaps the most important, is how to link up with political forces outside Britain that have the same general aims.

How do we organize a political meeting in Britain now? This hall has been bombed. The next one has been taken over as a canteen for the forces. A third is occupied by auxiliary fire services and can only be used for political purposes if we can get the approval of bureaucrats whose connection with the government is close. A fourth would be available, but the restricted transport services mean that the audience would never get home—buses stop at 9 p. m. in most places now. The shortage of paper limits the use of posters or handbills to advertise our meeting; the uncertainty of war-time travel means that the speaker from London may arrive a couple of hours late. People are working three shifts and fire watching four nights a month, and they have the Home Guard and half a dozen other war activities to fill their spare time. There is practically no private motoring, and if a speaker opposed to the government manages to get a car for a speaking tour, the Tories ask ugly questions about it in Parliament.

Under these conditions normal political activity has fallen to zero. In half our towns it is almost impossible to find the Labor Party. In others there is a skeleton organization of tired old people, mainly trade unionists, supported by trade-union and cooperative funds. The Communists are alive and active, but not in opposition. Their larger meetings are held in alliance with Lord Beaverbrook or with the Ministry of Information. Their line has been one of support for the Churchill government combined with pressure to remove some of the members of that government; they have also been vociferous for the second front. But except for them there has been a blackout of progressive politics as complete as the darkening of our cities that prevents so many people from getting to committees or public meetings.

Americans, accustomed to the regular holding of elections, may find it hard to realize the British position. Our Parliament was elected more than seven years ago, in 1935, at the time of the Abyssinian war. It was elected largely on the Tory government's promise to support the League of Nations, enforce sanctions, and check fascism. A month or two after the elections came the Hoare-Laval pact. The British author of that pact is today our ambassador at the key post of Madrid. Most of the 400-odd Tory M. P.'s elected in 1935 gained their seats on the promise that they would keep the peaceful Mr. Baldwin in power and have nothing to do with that dangerous fellow Churchill. All of them supported Mr. Chamberlain and Munich. Even when the plain evidence of defeat in Norway led to a change, a majority of these

M. P.'s voted still for Chamberlain, and Churchill had to take him into his Cabinet. The Parliament dominated by these men renews itself—on the motion of a Labor minister—every year, and every year it becomes a more tired, more stale, more decrepit collection of men and women. I first saw the British House of Commons in 1916, and after a good look at it went straight off to join the army. I have had a look at it at intervals since then, but I have never seen it so pathetically unrepresentative as it is today. Yet it has been officially decided that there shall be no renewal of it during the war, except in so far as members die and are replaced at by-elections.

And even when this happens, the "political truce" implies that there shall be no contest between the old parties. If a Tory dies, some other Tory is nominated. If he is opposed by an independent, the Labor and Liberal parties support the Tory, somewhat tepidly. The Communists support him actively and noisily and in the interests of "national unity." They sometimes find this very difficult: during the period when their paper, the *Daily Worker*, was suppressed they had to support, at Wallasey, a Tory who openly stated he approved of the paper's suppression as against a Socialist independent who condemned the suppression. But they managed it. They have managed even more difficult things—for instance, support for the ex-members of the Anglo-German Fellowship, the Link, and other semi-fascist bodies, put up as by-election candidates by the Tory party machine. For this machine is still Chamberlainite or worse; of scores of Tory candidates put up at by-elections none have come from the progressive wing of the party and only a very few can even be considered supporters of Mr. Churchill within that party.

When a Labor M. P. dies he is usually replaced by the trade-union official next on the list to be pensioned off. The average age of the Labor members in Parliament is even higher than that of the Tories: it is nearly ten years above the average age of the Parliament of 1914, and that was above the age at which human beings cease normally to learn anything.

It is possible for America, Australia, New Zealand, and other countries to hold elections in war time. The actual disturbance to the war effort of holding an election in Britain would be small compared with its benefit if it made people feel that they were again democratically represented. But an election here is impossible—not for physical reasons but for psychological reasons. British politicians are hypnotized by the political truce. This truce as first agreed on in 1939 meant only that the older parties would not oppose each other at by-elections. Then when independents began to emerge and one or two got elected, it was held to mean that all three parties should actively support the government candidate. Now it has undergone another extension: the government has announced that no "controversial legislation" will be de-

bated. This means that no post-war planning is possible, even if, as in the case of coal, nationalization is clearly needed for the purposes of the war. An even more extraordinary extension of the truce occurred this month when the Labor Party through its normal machinery chose as its spokesman in the important debate on the King's speech a progressive member, John Parker, secretary of the Fabian Society. The Tories objected that to allow him to speak would be a breach of the political truce, and on Mr. Churchill's own intervention he was tamely replaced by an elderly gentleman acceptable to the Tories.

A general election might of course be sprung on us by those in power if the victories in Africa seemed considerable enough to wipe out the past from the minds of the people. Until this occurs there is no parliamentary outlet except through by-elections. And no Tory members of Parliament have died since May of this year. My friend Sir Richard Acland proposed in the House of Commons last month a "staggered election," a renewal of Parliament by gradual stages, so many M. P.'s retiring at stated intervals. Half the speeches made in the debate echoed the need for some form of renewal of Parliament, but the united party whips won and only seventeen members voted for it.

Under the conditions I have described, the formation of a new political movement is an enormous task. People are restless and frustrated; the feeling that a change is needed breaks out in all sorts of ways. There is a sudden rush of new members into the Fabian Society; all sorts of political pamphlets enjoy large sales; the most popular feature on our radio is the "Brains Trust," an

occasionally serious "any questions?" hour; the army is discussing current affairs. And in spite of all the difficulties a new movement, called Common Wealth, is getting on its feet to shape a left-wing movement outside and inside the old parties against the present government and the policy of keeping things as they are.

In *The Nation* for June 27, 1942, I described some of the hopes on which this new movement was founded. Fulfilment of many of these hopes is not yet within sight. A few months after its formation in July, 1942, J. B. Priestley dropped out of the organization and out of politics. The unusual longevity of the Tory M. P.'s has prevented the Common Wealth group from appearing at by-elections, for it has so far chosen not to oppose Labor candidates indorsed by the government. But it is gathering members and building up considerable support for an immediate policy that includes independence for India (with mediation by the United Nations), nationalization of coal and some armament industries, and a program for greater equality between soldiers and civilians, workers and owners.

This movement, though largely composed of people as insular as the average in Britain, is beginning to feel the need for contact with political forces tending in the same direction outside Britain, particularly in America. The peoples of the United Nations need a new International, a body outside the various governments that will unite the common people. If this war is in fact part of a revolution, the forces on the same side of the mental barricades need to work together. How far have you got toward this in America?

Jim Crow Goes Abroad

BY JOSEPH JULIAN

THE Negro brigadier general, Benjamin O. Davis, was recently sent to England to investigate reports of trouble between white and Negro American troops stationed in the British Isles. After an inspection that lasted only a few days he issued a statement to the effect that the situation had been greatly exaggerated, that generally the boys were getting along fine together; occasionally a few social difficulties might arise, but so far as the army was concerned there was no problem—"white and colored troops are treated as equal, having exactly the same rights and privileges."

It is hard to reconcile General Davis's report with my own observations during my recent two months' stay in England or with what Negro soldiers told me. Technically, it is true about the equal rights and privileges, but prejudice never respects technicalities. Equality cannot

be created by a manual of army regulations; the men must feel it and think it and act it. The social difficulties mentioned by General Davis are not isolated cases and should not be considered of no concern to the army. Bad feeling between colored and white troops has military consequences.

Perhaps General Davis did not get around as much as he should have, or perhaps he did not consider it wise to make an issue of the matter at this time. An ugly and dangerous situation does exist, and it impairs the efficiency of the troops and depresses the morale of the entire American Negro population, already near the breaking-point.

It is particularly shocking to observe the Jim Crow bacillus being injected into England, a country without color prejudice, where the people regard Negroes not as

menials and comics but as human beings, and are guided in their relations with them by their natural reactions to them as individuals, not as Negroes. The prejudiced white American soldiers are not the only carriers of this germ. Sometimes it seems to have been introduced in England by order of the A. E. F. In a recent issue of the London *New Statesman and Nation* a correspondent writes:

... orders or requests have been issued by the American military authorities to the townspeople to the effect that white and colored troops should not be permitted in the same civilian canteens. In some cases the townspeople have refused to comply. Partly as a result of this the latter have become extremely annoyed at what is regarded as discrimination against the colored soldiers. As a further result scuffles between white and colored Americans have occurred when Negroes have entered, or tried to enter, dance halls or bars where the white Americans were already disporting themselves. Apparently in one case the white Americans remonstrated with a landlady for serving colored customers. The reply of the woman is significant: "Their money is as good as yours, and we like their company."

The average Briton appreciates the complexities of the Negro question but sees it as purely an American problem. He resents being told that he must develop prejudices.

One night I met an American Negro corporal in Piccadilly Circus, and after I left him jotted down our conversation almost verbatim. I think he simply and eloquently expressed the thoughts and feelings of the average Negro soldier with the A. E. F. in England. Our dialogue ran as follows:

"Got a light?"

"Here y'are."

"Thanks. You American?"

"Yeah."

"So am I. Where you from?"

"Pittsburgh. Where you from?"

"New York."

"I worked at the Savoy in Harlem for a while."

"Oh, I was up there just before I left."

(Brightening) "Yeah? Whose band was playin'?"

"I forget."

"They sent me first out to Oklahoma, an' then back to Fort Dix. I gotta gal out in Brooklyn I went to see one night, just before I come over here. I was a sergeant an' they busted me for it."

"Why?"

"A. W. O. L. She had a kid from me an' I wanted to see 'em both before I came over here. I didn't know if I'd ever come back again, so I wanted to see 'em. I made out an allotment to her."

"That's tough, being busted for that."

"Well, they gotta have rules in an army. I don't blame 'em. I'm a corporal now."

"How do you like it here?"

"Awright—'cept not many colored boys over here. Ya get lonesome sometimes."

"How do they treat you over here?"

"Who, the English?"

"Yes."

"Oh, hell, they treat ya fine. It's in the camp and around we get all the trouble and riots."

"You mean with American soldiers?"

"Yeah. We had three officers resign last week. They just didn't want nuthin' to do with us."

"White officers?"

"Yeah. Lot a them white boys still look at us like we ain't nuthin'—just to shine their shoes. They walk away from me when I walk down the street. They go out when I come into a pub for a drink. They change their seats when I sit down in a movie. Hell, sometimes I think maybe sometime one of these guys'll be needin' a drink from my flask—maybe lyin' wounded an' bleedin' and dyin'. I told one of my white officers that, and he growled at me and said, 'You just leave 'em there bleedin', don't touch 'em.' So I'll leave 'em. I'll leave 'em bleed and bleed till they die."

[At this moment two drunken white sailors staggered up to us. One of them plopped his arm on the Corporal's shoulder and said, "Darky, we're absolutely broke; could ya let us have something? We haven't a shilling t'our name." Without a moment's reflection he reached in his pocket, took out a half-crown, and put it in the sailor's hand.]

"I have a friend [he continued] came over here in 1936 with a band—white fellow—married an English girl. I was talkin' to them one day. He went across the street to get a paper. I stayed talkin' to his wife. Three white American soldiers come by—seen me talkin' to a white girl, and they ripped her fur piece off an' tore it up to pieces."

"Do you go into any of the American Service clubs here, Red Cross Club, and so forth?"

"I just keep by myself. I don't go lookin' for trouble no more. But sometimes when I have to stay in London overnight, see I drive a truck down here from where I'm stationed in Birmingham 'bout once a week, an' when I gotta stay over, I go over to the British soldiers' club an' they put me up. They treat you much better than at the American clubs. When the Americans do give you a bed, they make you feel they don't want to give it to you."

"How do most of you boys feel about the war?"

"I think most of us feel it don't matter much what happens. We just know we have to fight, so we fight."

"I know there's a lot more that has to be done, but don't you think some progress is being made? Negroes are being trained as pilots now, and many more branches of the services are open to them than ever before."

"Yeah, that's right, an', well, maybe after America gets a little messin' around, and gets bombed up some, it'll be better. They just been having it too easy, too much to eat an' everything. Maybe after they get messed up some, they'll begin to understand, maybe it'll come out awright."

"You feel much more comfortable with English soldiers than Americans?"

"Sure man, they drink with ya, they talk with ya. There ain't no difference with them. I'd like to stay here after the war, except the United States is still your home and you have a feelin' you wanna get back to your home no matter how bad things are there."

"Well, I hope it will work out better for you fellows. That's one thing this war's about—equal rights for all people. So long, soldier, I have to run along."

"So long."

It was the same story with each of the many Negro soldiers I talked to: "The English treat us fine—it's in the camp and around we get all the trouble and riots."

Apparently nothing is being done by the army or any other government agency to remedy the situation except some clumsy attempts at segregation. Instead of some

kind of educational program designed to eradicate the color bias by driving home to white soldiers how silly it is to talk about fighting for democracy when they don't mix with colored troops in their own ranks, official policy seems to be, "Keep them apart—as far apart as possible."

Both Russia and Germany have effectively used their ideological commissars to help build their powerful armies. Though we reject their systems of government, we could strengthen our own army tremendously by a similar technique of indoctrination. Let us have in our army commissars of "applied democracy" to keep our own ideology alive in the minds and hearts of soldiers. There is a vital need for such a department, not only as a means of overcoming Jim Crowism but generally to keep the original humane motives of our fighting men alive and integrated with their job of killing.

How Africa Changed the War

BY HERBERT ROSINSKI

A LIGHTNING-LIKE transformation has been wrought in the strategic scene by the events of the past few weeks. Seldom in history has the course of a vast conflict been so dramatically changed by a single, judiciously applied blow. How was it possible that the limited, if brilliantly executed, operations in Africa, the defeat of a fraction of the enemy's forces in an outlying theater of war, could alter so radically the position of forces a hundred times greater than those engaged? The explanation lies in the peculiar strategic pattern of the war.

Viewed in its broadest perspective, the war is a struggle for the great centers of population and production in Europe, Russia, India, and China; for the areas connecting them—the Near East, Burma, and Australasia; and for the control of the sea lanes leading from Great Britain and the United States to their allies and the various sectors of the front. Of these three great objectives the first is obviously the most important. It is in the struggle for the great centers of population and production that both sides have used the bulk of their forces; it is here also that the Axis powers, thanks to the advantages of initiative and interior lines, have scored their main successes over their inadequately prepared and coordinated opponents. They have overrun large and valuable areas and been able temporarily to consolidate them under their rule and for their benefit. In a global war, however, these successes, imposing as they must appear, are less important than the fact that neither in Russia nor in China has the Axis been able to push its victories to a

decisive knockout and liquidate the struggle in that sector. As the Axis offensives have bogged down and the decision has been found unattainable in the main arenas, the struggle has tended to shift to the second group of objectives—the pivotal connecting region.

These are inferior in population and resources and offer fewer facilities for the deploying and maintenance of mass armies but have outstanding importance as links between the main areas. Whichever side controls them is more or less able to isolate its opponents in their home bases. To the Axis powers, their occupation has held out the prospect of cutting off Russia and China from outside support and, beyond that, of carrying out a gigantic pincers movement against the central bastion of India. For the Allies, retention of these pivotal areas is a vital necessity if they are to defeat Axis attempts upon the coherence of their front, keep the activities of the two parts of the Axis in separate spheres, and possess springboards for their own eventual counter-offensives.

In this struggle the odds against the Allies have been as heavy as in that for the main centers, for the extent and configuration of these areas have imposed upon the defenders a fatal dispersal of their forces of which the Axis powers have not been slow to avail themselves. In an analysis printed in this journal on November 9, 1940, I pointed out that the conclusion of the military pact between Germany and Japan clearly foreshadowed such developments and that a German offensive in the Near East would try to exploit the unavoidable dispersal of British defense in that area in conjunction with Japa-

nese operations against British positions in the Far East.

That despite these exceedingly favorable conditions Germany and Japan have failed to break up the central Allied position around the Indian Ocean must be ascribed mainly to the energy of the Viceroy of India, Lord Linlithgow, whose skilful statesmanship has not received the recognition due it. Whether the fall of Burma could have been prevented if his efforts for the construction of a strategic railway between Burma and India had met with better success it is difficult to say, but there can be no doubt that it was his acute realization of the danger and his energetic insistence upon prompt and adequate counter-measures which brought about the successful reduction of Axis-fomented intrigues in Iraq and Iran. Why Hitler failed to follow up his successes in the Balkans, Crete, and Libya by pushing on into the Near East, overwhelming the weak and badly shaken British defense, and isolating Russia on the south, before he launched his main offensive against Russia in the west, remains the greatest strategic mystery of this war.

Even so, Rommel's threat to Egypt and the possibility that the Axis main forces would drive down through Turkey or the Caucasus left the Allies in a most precarious position in the Near East. And the situation was made worse by the ascendancy established by Axis air power in the central Mediterranean, which seriously restricted any assistance that might be expected from the naval forces in the eastern Mediterranean. In addition, the closing of the Mediterranean to merchant shipping and the consequent necessity to use the route around the Cape imposed a heavy strain upon the Allies' already overburdened shipping facilities.

With this strategic framework of the war in mind, we can see clearly the significance of the new move. By eliminating the western arm of the Axis pincers menacing the Near East the Allies have finally secured their grip on that vital area. Once the Axis powers have lost their foothold on the southern shore of the Mediterranean, they will be in no position to attempt to regain it in the teeth of Allied sea and air superiority. Behind that safe moat all North Africa will become one huge Allied base. Moreover, the reopening of the direct route through the Mediterranean under an umbrella of Allied air power will release several million tons of shipping and speed up the reinforcement of the entire Indian Ocean sector. Thus reinforced and with their Western flank made safe, the armies in India will be able to prepare for the reconquest of the vital Burmese area.

By this consolidation of the central belt from Morocco to Burma the Allies will not only have secured themselves against the destructive strategy of the two Axis groups but have gained the power to turn that strategy against its authors with a vengeance. Safely based along the African shore and protected by adequate aerial support, Allied sea

power for the first time in this war will be able to pass to the offensive on a large and effective scale.

The advantages of the Mediterranean region over the Atlantic coastline of Europe for the launching of the Allied counter-offensive are not restricted to the absence of those formidable fortifications with which in the north access to all likely landing points has been barred to the invader; nor are they to be found in the less tenacious resistance to be expected from the Latin member of the Axis. They consist above all in the incomparably greater opportunities offered by the Inland Sea for the isolation and separate annihilation of the enemy's forces. In the north any major Allied offensive, wherever attempted, would run into a continuous block of enemy territory stretching from the Pyrenees to Norway, an area served by a most highly developed system of roads, railways, and waterways, permitting the enemy to concentrate greatly superior forces at any threatened point in a minimum time. In the Mediterranean area, on the other hand, communications between the various sectors of the enemy's front line are severely limited, owing in part to the deeply indented coastline and in part to the paucity of means of transportation. Conditions are favorable for the isolation and capture of a large number of important Axis positions—Sardinia, Sicily, the Peloponnesus, Crete—by the judicious exploitation of Allied naval and aerial superiority.

From the vantage-points thus gained it should prove not too difficult to extend the offensive to sections of the mainland and thus, step by step, to force the enemy back in a series of strictly limitable operations, without committing the outcome to a single, irretrievable action as would inevitably be the case in the north. Through these moves, plus the constant menace of an invasion from Great Britain, the enemy can be subjected to a continuous strategic squeeze play and shorn of the power of effective retaliation.

The military possibilities of thus turning the enemy's own methods against him are perhaps no greater than the psychological repercussions that may be expected. Of the effect on Italian morale few will entertain much doubt. In Germany too, although that country will be less immediately threatened, the memory of the sudden collapse of German resistance in the summer of 1918, when the imperial armies were still standing far in enemy territory, must haunt many millions, undermining their determination even though desperation makes them go on.

As the Allies advance in the Mediterranean and Axis defeat in the West becomes more and more imminent, the leaders of Japan will have to choose between preparing to sell their hides as dearly as possible or trying to reach a negotiated peace while they still have something to offer. The militarists at present in control are unlikely to decide on the latter alternative, but the situation must surely look different to the court circles, bureaucrats, and

representatives of big business who have been temporarily pushed into the background by the militarists. These groups retain sufficient influence to be able to step forward and reassume leadership in an emergency, and in the sacred person of the Emperor they would command the only authority capable of reconciling the Japanese people to the collapse of all their expectations.

While the perspectives opened up in every direction by the new development are great enough to justify the wave of enthusiasm which has swept over the United Nations, the road to victory will still be long and hard. What has happened is this: a fraction of the German-Italian forces, separated from the bulk of their strength by the Mediterranean and half-isolated by Allied sea and air power, has been overwhelmed and through the simultaneous landing of Allied forces in French North Africa threatened with complete annihilation or ejection. If this can be achieved, the Allies will have gained an excellent base for the launching of their main offensive against the bulk of the enemy's forces. Success here will offer them the opportunity to utilize their superior sea power to impose battle upon the enemy under disadvantageous conditions in a series of isolated or semi-isolated encounters. To follow up these advantages, however, and press them home against the enemy's main forces near the centers of his strength will require an effort incomparably larger than that of the present preparatory campaign, an effort that will tax the strength of the Allies to the utmost. The main task lies before us, and we should not forget that in war, until the final decision has been won, every success counts only in so far as it is exploited to secure the final victory.

AUTONOMOUS

BY MARK VAN DOREN

In jealousy of cause and pride of plan
He thinks he made himself, this happy man.
He was the decider; picked a year,
A womb to grow in, and a hemisphere;
And when he walked was master of the choice
Who fathered his first gait and tuned his voice.
Of all earth's people to its oddest ends
He summoned these few to be his natural friends;
From out the mist of women he contrived
The stepping forth of one whom then he wived;
And now that sons repeat him it is skill
Rewarded, it is accident of will.
The maple where it stands is proof of seed.
He knows it, and can measure by its need,
Among so many neighbors, a trunk's tallness;
And by its shade the after comer's smallness,
Dwarf to its sire. Such things, he says, must be
If soil decides. But he is not a tree;
And thinks that he was present in the dark
When skin was chosen over root and bark.

In the Wind

A PETITION is being circulated in South Carolina requesting the state legislature to make the public display of a picture of Abraham Lincoln an offense punishable by a fine of \$50 or thirty days in prison. "You wouldn't hang a picture of Hitler or Tojo in a public building, would you?" asks the *Anderson Independent*, which favors the idea. "Any person guilty of such a thing would be tarred and feathered. But neither Tojo nor Hitler has done as much damage to the South as Abe Lincoln did." The man who started the petition, incidentally, is named Lynchfield.

FROM A LETTER in a recent issue of *Time*: "In the event of a Japanese invasion of the Pacific Coast what would be the effect in the occupied territory upon: (1) the titles of real estate; (2) equities of corporations in occupied territory; (3) United States currency and bank accounts?"

FERDINAND EBERSTADT, vice-chairman of the War Production Board, was urged to add some labor representatives to his staff. "I don't need to," he said. "If I want to know anything about labor, all I need to do is ask my old friend Matthew Woll."

MARSHALL FIELD'S *Chicago Sun* has not broken Colonel McCormick's hold over Chicago, but it is standing the gaff better than the *Tribune's* former competitors, all now extinct. The *Sun's* circulation is at present about 200,000, and it is rising at the rate of about 10,000 a month.

FROM AN ARTICLE in the *American Mercury* called Credo of an Old-Fashioned Conservative, by George Barton Cutten, ex-president of Colgate University: "I suppose if God had 'the open mind' and should become a radical instead of the conservative He is, the girl babies would now be born with hair-line eyebrows, purple fingernails, and crimson toenails. But no, the girl babies come along no different from what they were ten thousand years ago. . . . What a jaundiced muddle this world would be if God should cease to be conservative and permit acquired characteristics to be transmitted."

ACCORDING TO the *London News-Chronicle*, the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce is opposing a proposed municipal regulation because under it "women would be compelled to go out in the blackout and fight fires with strange men."

THE CHRISTIAN FRONT in Boston, one of the largest centers of Coughlinite agitation, became the Citizens' Constitutional Committee during the recent election and will carry on under that name. The Committee was set up chiefly to fight against a token resolution on world federation which was on the ballot in forty-two Massachusetts districts.

[We invite our readers to submit material for *In the Wind*—either clippings with source and date or stories that can be clearly authenticated. A prize of \$5 will be awarded each month for the best item.—EDITORS THE NATION.]

Crisis of Confidence

NEARLY a month has passed since the democratic front found itself favored with the presence of Darlan as one of the new fighters for the Four Freedoms, and it is time to assay calmly the value of so hotly debated a maneuver. As in every operation of this kind, two aspects are involved: the military and the political. On military grounds the Eisenhower enthusiasts have been strongly supported by the facts. That Dakar and West Africa have come over to the bicephalic Admiral, who with one eye smiles at the Allies and with the other at Marshal Pétain, has given them an apparently unanswerable argument. Those who still see in the acquisition of Darlan some dark spots, even in the purely military field, have been overwhelmed by the fabulous record of thousands of square miles of ports and bases, of richness in ships and rubber and other raw materials—won overnight, without a single shot.

It might be claimed that the African campaign is not yet over, and that the difficulties ahead are considerable. A certain restraint might be justified in anticipation of new developments which may test severely the loyalty of the new allies. But we are not qualified to discuss this point. And it is not even our desire to try to moderate the joy of the generals whose job is to win a battle in the least possible time and with the fewest possible losses. Let us, therefore, assume for the sake of argument that from a military point of view the winning of Darlan was a master-stroke.

But if, in the military field, the apologists of the Darlan collaboration can cut down every critic with the testimony of the facts, in the political field the facts speak with equal eloquence on the other side. Wherever it has been possible to register popular reactions, the effect produced by the Darlan appointment has been calamitous. Perhaps the country in which the reaction has been least bad is the United States itself. This is a phenomenon worthy of a lengthy study, but one in which it is not difficult to perceive powerful reflections of isolationist thinking. People who on the eve of Pearl Harbor did not realize the danger coming from Japan can hardly be expected to realize today the danger involved in taking an undesirable like Darlan and investing him with superior authority.

Everywhere else depression and bewilderment have been dominant. A Council of Political War—had there been one—would have registered the tremendous damage already done to the cause of the United Nations in the occupied countries, in the few neutral countries still

left in Europe, in Great Britain, and in Latin America.

To measure accurately the political damage, we must take into account the fact that from the beginning the cause of the United Nations has carried the dead weight of a very deep mistrust in regard to the character and objectives of the present struggle. If that mistrust has not expressed itself more strongly, it is because the hate of Hitler and the clear conviction that to destroy him is a matter of life and death have restrained people from any criticism which could affect adversely the course of the war. But there are millions who greeted with enthusiasm the Atlantic Charter and the noble speeches of the President and of Vice-President Wallace, yet felt mercilessly shaken on the following day by all the contradictions which cloud the policy of the United Nations. For, as Mr. Willkie said in his Toronto speech, "this war is either a 'grand coalition' of peoples, fighting a common war for liberation, or it is nothing."

The truth must be courageously spoken. And the truth is that even today, in the midst of the struggle, millions of people are tortured by the idea that out of this war may come, not a better world than followed the last war, but perhaps a much worse one. They look around. They see men in the ministries, in the foreign offices, speaking publicly about democracy and enjoying the double game of collaborating with all the half-fascists while ignoring or discarding altogether proved anti-fascists.

For the cause of the democratic fight it was a great risk to leave such men, compromised by years of mistakes, hesitations, and, in some cases, pro-fascist inclinations, in prominent posts in the democratic front. But from the moment that those same men defied the democratic feeling of the peoples of the democratic nations by indulging in all kinds of small Metternich-like tricks, the crisis of confidence acquired the most disquieting proportions.

The war is not yet finished. The Allied troops are not yet nearing the German border. The moment has not been reached when the diplomatic technicians and the professional politicians can risk a cynical shrug as their only answer to the disappointment of the people. Difficult crises lie ahead of us in which the people will be needed quite as much as all the war materials that all the United Nations can produce. And for the people it will not be a Darlan, even as an occasional guest of the democracies, that will keep alive their enthusiasm and restore their confidence.

J. A. DEL V.

Political Value of the German Emigration

[There can be no serious talk of political war that does not take into account political war inside Germany. Information on Germany's internal situation is hard to check, but the consensus of opinion as to the likelihood of an effective opposition is most discouraging. It should be possible, however, to gauge the political value of the German emigration. We have asked a political refugee, at present not associated with any party, to present the problem and to formulate a few questions. Representatives of the various groups will be asked to reply.]

HITLER'S war on his adversaries inside the German state has reproduced in exile the whole range of political creeds whose confusion speeded the downfall of the Weimar republic. In the ranks of the emigration are such diverse elements as early National Socialists who complain that Hitler has betrayed socialism and industrialists whose urge for conquest never went beyond the subjugation of the labor unions, Social Democrats who blame the fall of the republic on the Communists and Communists whose single criterion for any action is its effect on the Soviet Union, defenders of capitalist democracy and Catholics of the center who expounded democracy by decree.

It seems strange that in the turmoil of wars, invasions, surrenders, and escapes the original cleavages of these political groups should have been so little affected. All political emigrations are burdened with internal dissensions, but in most a strong common purpose acts as solvent; for citizens of the conquered countries the unifying element is the fight for national deliverance. Why is it, then, that the common hope of all German anti-Nazis—the collapse of Hitler's power—has proved so weak a bond?

In no other country is the national destiny so closely bound up with the solution of its social problems. Every German political émigré knows that the great social conflicts which the Weimar republic pretended to ignore—and which Hitler has pretended to resolve in his caricature of a people's state—will come to the fore again the moment the Nazi fiction of the *Volkgemeinschaft* breaks down. But the émigrés are preparing no answer. They refuse to recognize that the fight against Hitler is a fight on the issue of socialism. Having themselves no common social goal, they have no basis for common action.

To hope that from the ashes of the Third Reich there will arise a new Germany free from all links with the past is sheer romance. But to assume, on the other hand, that the German people are only awaiting the day when

they will again be led by the statesmen of the Weimar coalition is the privilege of political *rentiers* who see in the Hitler dictatorship nothing more than an unfortunate episode. Post-Hitler Germany will present in a most acute form all the problems that the reconstruction of Europe will have to face. That is why a mature political leadership in the German emigration could help to clear a way through the fog of ideologies and emotions to a saner future.

But instead of meeting the challenge with conviction and courage, the leading groups of the German emigration are playing the diplomatic game. Where they should speak of the social prerequisites of a German democracy they repeat the reactionary nonsense of foreign education for the German people. Their contribution to any real comprehension of the phenomenon of National Socialism is nil; whatever has been done in this field is the work of a few independent men who have freed themselves from the time-honored clichés.

The more tenuous the home ties of the émigré groups become, the more shadowy the remains of their political influence the more each one endeavors to win official recognition as the chosen representative of the new Germany. They do not seem to know that their future position will depend not on their good connections in foreign government offices but on the confidence which their activities inspire in the German masses.


Ten years have not effaced the memory of the ignominious capitulation of the leaders of German anti-fascism. Nothing will bring back what they lost save their own will to fight for it, and they can draw strength only from the support of the workers and soldiers of Germany.

It is not surprising that fear, need, and cynicism have warped the fighting fiber of anti-fascist refugees. Perhaps it is only human of them to choose to speak the language that will please official ears rather than run the risk of losing their last refuge. But a people's war cannot be won or a people's peace prepared by such tactics.

FOUR QUESTIONS TO GERMANS

It might be profitable to invite discussion on certain basic questions which will have to be settled before the German left can hope to find a platform for political action. I suggest consideration of the following points:

1. What forces in Germany—besides the Nazi Party—do you consider a menace to the peace of the world and to the freedom of the German people? How would you propose to deal with these forces?
2. Are you for a unilateral disarming of Germany and the policing and reeducating of the German people from outside?
3. Are the German people responsible for the material damage caused by Hitler's armies in the occupied



countries? Are they under moral obligation to make restitution?

4. What kind of relations do you advocate between post-Hitler Germany and the Soviet Union?

Behind the Enemy Line

BY ARGUS

THERE is as yet nothing to indicate how the invasion of North Africa has affected the *Stimmung* in Germany—the mood and sentiments of the people. Internal propaganda shows a tendency to sheer away from the main point in peripheral arabesques. For instance, Herr Fritsche, the radio favorite, has thought up a fable in which the African campaign is linked to a dark money-making scheme. The English, according to this tale, arrived in Africa with billions of counterfeit French notes, secretly printed by the Bank of England. In some unexplained manner a quarrel will soon break out between Britain and the United States over whether French North Africa shall be joined to the pound bloc or the dollar bloc. Small fortunes will be made by the Algerian Jews, and of course great fortunes will be piled up in London and New York. This idiotic story gives an idea of what efforts are being made to conceal the character of the African dish with strange, highly spiced sauces.

When the present situation is touched on, the official theme is still the strength of the European fortress: it was planned to launch an invasion of Europe from Algeria, but the attempt was repulsed; the fortress has been proved impregnable. A new word has been coined to fit the case—South Wall, recalling the famous West Wall between Germany and France. By occupying the rest of France the Germans have erected an unassailable South Wall between the fortress of Europe and its would-be attackers. For the present it is impossible to say how well this not unskillfully elaborated thesis bolsters German spirits.

That the *Stimmung* is worse than ever before is certain. For if we have no concrete information about how the people took the news of the second phase of the African offensive, the American invasion, some interesting material is at hand showing how they reacted to the first phase, the British advance in Libya. The landings in Algeria and Morocco were made in November. Rommel was defeated some time before, in October. Now in October the Nazi press suddenly began to be filled with vehement attacks on the pessimists, the defeatists, the rumor-mongers. Analysis of a large number of newspapers shows that for every article of this kind printed in September, 4.2 such articles appeared in October.

For the most part the loose talk against which the articles were directed was not ordinary gossip about domestic matters, though that also came in for condemna-

tion. The *Thüringer Gauzeitung*, for example, on October 8 declaimed against the many "strictly confidential stories about the household and clothes of high-placed personages." And in the *Oldenburgischen Staatszeitung* of October 11 a district leader denounced the habit of casting aspersions on the Winter Aid. "People are always wondering," he said, "what is done with all the money that is collected; the wildest rumors concerning it are going around." More of the papers loosed their thunder against rumors about the war. To illustrate:

The *Freiheitskampf* devoted its lead article on October 8 to the "perverse human scum whose pitiful vestiges of gray matter have so shriveled away that the miserable cowards dare to make a joke of our victory."

In the *Rostocker Anzeiger* of October 6 the district leader published this announcement: "Irresponsible elements in Mecklenburg are circulating rumors which must be stopped at once. Those who spread them must be rebuked, and all loose talk must be suppressed."

The *Thüringer Zeitung* for October 8 said: "A great many people are talking too much about the *Stimmung* in Germany. They think that the final round of the war will be decided by the *Stimmung* in the various countries. They examine *Stimmung* barometers and discuss the trend with gloating thoroughness."

The *Oldenburgische Zeitung* of October 10 complained: "We know our people. We know how their credulousness was shamefully exploited before. Once more our enemies are trying to undermine our faith." The *Essener Nationalzeitung* of October 10 warned against the "borers" and those "who listen to the broadcasts from London." The *Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung* on the same day referred to the "contagious disease caught by persons who listen to the London radio."

The *Hakenkreuz-Banner* on October 25 contained an outburst against people who can always see more than appears on the surface. "When they get a letter from the front they draw all sorts of conclusions from it. When they read a newspaper they look for what is said between the lines. If rations are increased, they know it is only done to boost the *Stimmung*; therefore the situation must be serious. If rations are decreased, it is clear that affairs must have reached a critical pass. They hear that troops are going through to the east, and assume disaster; or to the west—that looks very bad too."

Such quotations could be continued for several columns. Yet in October no one in Germany had any presentiment of Algeria or Morocco or Tunisia; only in Libya had anything happened. Rommel's defeat, however, was enough to bring to the surface the underlying mood of doubt and pessimism in all classes. The quotations merely confirm what we have long known from other sources. It cannot be doubted that an increasingly large number of Germans suffer from chronic gloom about the war.

Gandhi, Cripps, and Churchill

BY LOUIS FISCHER

[The following article is Mr. Fischer's rebuttal of the arguments advanced by Graham Spry in The Nation for November 14. These, in turn, were Mr. Spry's answer to Mr. Fischer's analysis of "Why Cripps Failed," which appeared in The Nation for September 19 and 26.]

GRAHAM SPRY'S reply is superficially clever but entirely unconvincing. Mr. Spry flatly denies my explanation of the failure of the Cripps mission to India in March-April, 1942. His denial was cabled from Sir Stafford Cripps's office in London to the British embassy in Washington, which submitted it to *The Nation*. Knowing that modern man is skeptical of official denials, Spry undertakes to prove his denial. That is where he fails.

Spry's chief point is that the Congress Party's rejection of the Cripps offer did not mention the promise of the Indian National Government, which I believe Cripps made and then withdrew. "This," Spry writes, "is itself conclusive that no promise was made at the beginning of the negotiations." It is in no sense conclusive. The Congress Party adopted its resolution rejecting the British War Cabinet's proposal on April 1 and gave the resolution to Cripps on April 3. The rejection was complete. Congress, nevertheless, suggested that the resolution remain unpublished and that the negotiations continue. But why should Congress have wished to continue the talks after having unconditionally rejected the offer which Cripps brought from London? Does this not show that Cripps had offered them something which was not in the London government's draft? The Congress resolution rejected the written draft, but it could not in the same resolution mention the promise of a National Government because it was not rejecting the promised government. It was going on with the negotiations because of that promise. On the part of Congress this was a very skilful way of conducting the negotiations: by rejecting the written proposals from London it indicated to Cripps that the success of his mission depended on his keeping the oral promise.

I hate to accuse Spry of disingenuousness, and I am not doing so. But he comes dangerously near it when he says: "The statements of the Congress resolution quite specifically deny Fischer's thesis. They read: 'The British War Cabinet's proposals are vague, altogether incomplete, and there would appear to be no vital changes in the present structure contemplated.'" This very text proves that Congress was criticizing and rejecting the British War Cabinet's written proposals and not the oral

promise which Cripps made in New Delhi to Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, president of the Congress Party.

That promise was not made on March 25 when Azad first went to Cripps to receive the draft offer and, as Spry says, to listen to explanations. This was not a "talk." The conversations, according to Spry himself, came after this preliminary contact. First, on March 27, Gandhi saw Cripps. Gandhi, as he told me later, "found nothing good" in the written proposals and said so to Cripps. But he asked Cripps "to perform a miracle," to do something which would save the situation and lead to a settlement. Faced with the collapse of the mission to which he attached so much personal and political importance, Sir Stafford went beyond his written proposals and told Congress representatives that India could have a National Government which would function as a Cabinet and not be subject to the Viceroy's veto.

On March 29 Cripps gave his first interview to the Indian press. Scores of newspapermen were present, and a stenographic record of Cripps's statements was later given to the papers. All newspapers quoted Cripps as saying that India could have an immediate "Cabinet" government. Now especially in an Englishman's mouth, "Cabinet" means a responsible government of ministers and not an advisory council of men whose wishes the Viceroy might veto.

In the third paragraph of his reply, Spry asserts vehemently that "Cripps did not make, did not seek to make, to any Indian political leaders any promise of National or Cabinet government with full powers in the war period," and thereafter throughout his cabled article Spry stresses that there is no evidence of "a promise of full Cabinet government" having been made, that Congress leaders realized that "complete war-time powers had not been promised," "that Cabinet or National government with full powers was not under discussion." Is this what Spry is denying? He is wasting cable tolls. I never said anything about "full" or "complete" powers. Spry has set up a man of straw in order to knock him down. No Congress leader expects England to quit India during the war, and no Congress leader asked or expected a National Government with "full" powers. The entire course of the negotiations showed that. Congress negotiators said repeatedly, as Azad wrote to Cripps on April 10, that "the [British] commander-in-chief in India would have control of the armed forces and the conduct of operations and other matters connected therewith. . . . We have no desire to upset in the middle of the war the

present military organization or arrangements." In view of the wide scope of the commander-in-chief's activities, it is obvious that Congress never anticipated "full" powers for the Indian National Government. The prolonged talks about a defense formula sought to demarcate the separate functions of the Indian Defense Minister on the one hand and of the British commander-in-chief on the other. Then why does Spry talk about a promise of "full" powers? Just to deny a statement I never made?

Hoping to salvage his mission, thinking that the reactionary imperialists in England who are his enemies had been deflated and frightened by the severe British military reverses in the Far East, Cripps offered the Indians a National Government which would try to enlist Indians in support of the war. Then he was subjected to pressure from behind the scenes. The dichotomy which resulted becomes manifest in Cripps's letter of April 7 to Azad (published with other documents in the Congress "White Paper"). In this letter Cripps says he hopes "it will be possible for His Excellency the Viceroy to embark forthwith upon the task of forming the new National Government in consultation with the leaders of Indian opinion." That is the way national governments are formed in European democracies, by a constitutional chief executive consulting the party leaders. But in the same letter Cripps also speaks of "the Viceroy's Executive Council." An Executive Council is not a Cabinet. Cripps was being pulled in two directions. The next day matters were cleared up for him. Cripps had received a Congress defense formula which used the expression "National Cabinet." On April 8, according to Spry, Cripps "deleted the term 'National Cabinet' and made his own position once again clear beyond any possible doubt by inserting the words 'Executive Council.' . . ."

If Mr. Spry will reread his own article he will find that this assertion contains a serious inaccuracy. For he says farther on that "this formula had been originally drafted by the Viceroy. . . ." Of course the Viceroy did not want a National Government. We are now in the area of the cleavage between Cripps, who wanted to bring about a settlement, and others who opposed real concessions to the Indian independence movement. Incidentally, I never charged Cripps with bad faith. He did not withdraw his promise because he had made it without sincerity; he withdrew it because he was stabbed in the back by Englishmen who differed with him.

On April 9, Spry says, Congress accepted the defense formula, and it looked as if Cripps's mission was going to succeed. He tells of the rejoicing of Congress people over this success. Then why did the negotiations break down? This is what Spry never explains. He rejects my explanation. But where is his? He declares that on April 9 Azad and Nehru called on Cripps to "convey their acceptance of the defense formula. In this long interview they raised the whole issue of the powers of the

Viceroy and insisted that the Viceroy should act as constitutional monarch only." Naturally. Azad and Nehru explained that they were ready to defend India in cooperation with the British, but what about the National Government in which the Indian Defense Minister would function? In other words, they did not quite accept the Viceroy's defense formula. They accepted it provided there was a National Government. Then why did they rejoice? Because they had assumed that this would present no difficulties. Had not Cripps promised it to them? If Cripps had never spoken to them of a National Government and if they had all understood they were negotiating about their future roles in the Viceroy's Executive Council, how could the misunderstanding have arisen so late in the talks?

Among many reasons which I adduced in my original articles for believing that Cripps did promise India an immediate National Government, was that when Azad quoted that promise in his letter to Cripps of April 11, Cripps's letter in reply never denied the promise. Now Spry contends that Cripps's first letter of April 11—he wrote two letters to Azad that day—gave the reasons why a National Government was impossible. True. But it did not deny the promise. It merely explained why the promise could not be kept, and we are therefore entitled to think that Cripps had been convinced behind the scenes that he would not be allowed to keep it.

There are, then, two Azad letters to Cripps, dated April 10 and April 11. In both Azad quotes the exact words in which Cripps had promised an Indian National Government immune to the Viceroy's veto. Cripps answered both on April 11. In neither did he deny the promise.

In New Delhi, on May 24, I had a long conversation with Jawaharlal Nehru, a prince among men and a militant anti-fascist at a time when many members of the present British government—not Cripps, of course—were fawning on Hitler and Mussolini and appeasing Japan. Nehru said that Cripps, it seemed to him, "was not a free agent." Early in the conferences, Nehru told me, Cripps had spoken of a National Government with the Viceroy playing a role like that of the British King and not interfering in government affairs. "Later," Nehru continued, "Cripps withdrew this, I believe under threats of resignation which Wavell and the Viceroy telegraphed to Churchill."

In Wardha, on June 10, Azad said to me: "Cripps definitely told me that the new government would be a Cabinet with the Viceroy acting as the King did in England. We had not discussed the composition of the government, but we expected that the Viceroy would appoint it after consultation with the parties. Congress did not think it would have a majority in the Cabinet. When Cripps arrived in India, we asked him whether his proposals went beyond the Amery declaration of August,

1940, which promised an enlarged Viceroy's Executive Council, and Cripps replied: 'You don't believe I would have come all the way to India to bring you no more than that.' Azad is the greatest authority on the Moslem religion in India.

In Bombay, on June 24, I interviewed Rajagopalachari, than whom there is no more honest man in Europe or Asia. He favored the acceptance of the Cripps proposals no matter how little they gave, and he differs so much with Gandhi that he is not supporting the current civil-disobedience campaign. He said to me: "Let me recapitulate the Cripps negotiations for you. He began by offering us a National Government."

I said: "Did you understand that Cripps was offering you a responsible Cabinet government not subject to the Viceroy's veto?"

Rajagopalachari: "Yes. We did not go into detail. Then we discussed defense. . . . When we returned to the question of the National Government, Cripps told us it would be subject to the Viceroy's veto. On this we broke."

Will Cripps say that Nehru, Azad, and Rajagopalachari lie? Do the documents lie? Did all the journalists who heard him say "Cabinet" government lie?

Spry contends that in war time it would have been impossible to introduce the constitutional changes necessitated by a responsible National Government. The Congress leaders would have preferred to see such changes, and they always cite Churchill's June, 1940, offer of union with France as contemplating a much more radical change. But they would have been satisfied with Cripps's own solution: at his March 29 press conference Cripps stated that "a good deal could be done by changing the conventions or adopting new ones—he particularly mentioned that the Executive Council could become a Cabinet." The constitution could remain unaltered for a while, but the Viceroy's veto would cease to exist. That would be the new convention. Why, Spry, was that Cripps suggestion not carried out?

Spry asserts that an Indian National Government would not have been a responsible government, since it could not have been overthrown or replaced. There is a difficulty here, but it is surmountable with British goodwill. The Cabinet might have been made responsible to the provincial legislatures of India, which are elected by popular vote. The Cabinet might have been made responsible to the several Indian political parties, and Cripps recognized the great influence of at least one of those parties—Congress—by conducting his key conferences in India with it. But to whom is the present British government of India responsible? Nobody in India. Who in India can remove it? And since when are the British in India so concerned about responsibility? Only a few weeks ago Mr. Allah Baksh, the Moslem Prime Minister of Sind, responsible to the popularly elected provincial

legislature of Sind, relinquished his honorary British titles and criticized the statements of Churchill and Amery on India. The British governor of Sind immediately removed Allah Baksh from office. (I take these facts from the London *New Statesman and Nation*, edited by my good friend Kingsley Martin, who is now on a visit to the United States. Apparently the British censor in India did not think that the whole truth about the Sind affair was fit for print in America.)

Graham Spry and Kingsley Martin are at pains to prove that the pacifism of Gandhi and the shortcomings of Congress are chiefly or partly to blame for the obstacles to a settlement in India. Is this so? Gandhi urged Cripps to settle the Indian problem. He said to me that he favored an Indian National Government consisting of the Princes, Moslems, and Congress, which would sign an alliance with England or the United Nations to help prosecute the war. He said he does not wish the Axis to win the war. He said if India gets a National Government it may go "war mad." Gandhi knows that Nehru, Azad, and Rajagopalachari are not pacifists and do not believe in non-violence. Rajagopalachari told Herbert L. Matthews the other day (see the *New York Times* of November 12) that "if Nehru were in a National Government he would not let Gandhi's pacifism get control. He would help win the war." Gandhi is more important than anybody in Congress, but he is not Congress, and if he were sure that India could get partial independence now as a first instalment on complete post-war liberty, I think that though he would not aid the war effort, he would not obstruct it. I believe that pacifists and expacifists are prone to exaggerate Gandhi's readiness to let his pacifism intrude on practical politics.

No, if Sir Stafford Cripps wishes to find the primary difficulty in the Indian situation he does not have to look so far as India. He need merely look across Whitehall to 10 Downing Street, where Winston Churchill lives and works. On November 10 Churchill told an audience in London that England has no desire for more territory, but "we mean to hold our own." That applies to India. "I have not become the King's First Minister," Churchill continued, "in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire." That is really why Cripps failed.

CONTRIBUTORS

TOM WINTRINGHAM played an important part in organizing and training the British Home Guard. He is the author of "New Ways of War."

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
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BOOKS *and the* ARTS

Constitutional Practices vs. Constitutional Revolution

A NEW CONSTITUTION NOW. By Henry Hazlitt.
Whittlesey House. \$2.50.

THIS is another "now" book, although it would seem that Mr. Hazlitt intends his title to be taken in a somewhat Pickwickian sense, inasmuch as he admits that his proposal, besides being revolutionary in itself, would require a virtual revolution to put it across—and revolutions, even in such revolutionary times as these, are apt to take time.

The proposal which Mr. Hazlitt urges is by no means a new one in its general outlines, but it has never before been advocated with quite such insistency or on this scale in terms of paper and ink. In brief, Mr. Hazlitt wishes to see our present "Presidential" or "Congressional" system (it is today the former rather than the latter) replaced by the British "Cabinet" system with some slight modifications. More in detail, our present Congress of two substantially equal chambers would be superseded by one in which the role of the Senate would be reduced to that of discussion and criticism; the President—except for certain ceremonial purposes, would give way to a "Premier" who would be elected by the House of Representatives and would have power, subject to the House's approval, to choose a Cabinet either from its membership or—in part at least—from the outside; the legislative initiative—today divided among the President, the numerous committees of Congress, and the members of the two houses—would be concentrated in the Premier, acting in consultation with his Cabinet; and finally, elections by the calendar, while not done away with, would become of secondary interest. The House would be chosen for four years, but would be subject to dissolution at any time by the Premier, who in turn would be subject to be thrown out of office at any time by an adverse vote of the House unless he was able, by appealing to the electorate, to secure a House which would support him.

What is Mr. Hazlitt's argument for his revolutionary proposal? In a few words it is that the tension which exists under our system of checks and balances between the President and Congress exposes us in normal times either to irresponsiveness to the public need for legislative reforms, when the President prefers the role of King Log, or to government by whim when he casts himself as King Stork, Congress being in either case unable to provide an effective leadership capable of commanding the backing of the country as a whole. And in times of crisis, such as the present, the situation becomes indefinitely worse, for then the country is constantly forced to choose between deadlock and dictatorship, and of course plumps for the latter, inevitably.

That there is an undesirable amount of truth to this arraignment of our constitutional system no candid and informed person would undertake to deny; and Mr. Hazlitt is able to point his argument by a telling reference in his Preface to the President's Labor Day address to Congress,

in which he informed that body that unless it repealed a certain statutory provision pronto, he would do the job himself—and Congress complied without a word of protest. At the same time, I remain unconvinced that the President's threat thus to suspend the Constitution for the duration ("When the war is won the powers under which I act automatically revert to the people—to whom they belong") was a necessary outcome of the Constitution's shortcomings. Rather, it seems to me to have been the result of some extremely bad advice.

Evaluating Mr. Hazlitt's brief for his proposal in the light of events of the past decade, I feel that it indulges in rather too much exaggeration to be as effective as it might have been. Thus his stock example of deadlock is the Senate's rejection of the Treaty of Versailles, although that was confirmed overwhelmingly by "a great and solemn referendum" of exactly the kind that would naturally have occurred had the system Mr. Hazlitt proposes been in operation. Likewise, he brings forward as a particularly black example of Presidential whim Mr. Roosevelt's court proposal of February 5, 1937—which was defeated! And the important changes which the "two-party system"—if there still is such a system—has undergone in both Great Britain and the United States in recent years, especially on account of the political consolidation of group and class interests, go practically ignored. Indeed, it seems to be assumed that this system functions in the United States today in precisely the same way as it did in the Britain of Disraeli and Gladstone.

But the book also advocates a number of less sweeping reforms, either as marking steps toward the greater consummation or as rendering life more livable under existing arrangements. One of these is that present methods of amending the Constitution ought to be replaced by a less cumbersome and more democratic method. Such a proposal would have had much greater significance two generations ago, when sectional differences were much more pronounced. Today an amendment which has back of it a majority of the electorate of the country as a whole is fairly likely to have a majority in a sufficient number of states to secure its adoption. The fact is that Mr. Hazlitt attaches undue importance to this method of adapting the Constitution to changed conditions, arguing that it is more "candid" than interpretation, the method which our constitutional practice has always preferred. Such a view is naive to say the least. Either constitutional provisions must be couched in terms which unavoidably leave considerable discretion to their official interpreters, or the Constitution must in time take on, as Marshall put it, "the prolixity of a code." Naive, too, is Mr. Hazlitt's further contention that the size of the Supreme Court ought to be frozen by constitutional amendment. On an early page of his volume Mr. Hazlitt stigmatizes that "strange form of national self-distrust" which tries "to protect ourselves against our own future knowledge." The proposal just mentioned is an apt, if unintentioned, illustration of this national shortcoming.

Mr. Hazlitt would also like to see treaties ratified by a majority vote of both House and Senate instead of by a two-thirds vote of the latter. The Joint Resolution of June, 1934, by which the President was authorized by a majority vote of the two houses to accept membership for the United States in the International Labor Organization, not to mention certain recent decisions of the court (see, for example, *United States v. Belmont*, 301 U. S. 324; 1937), seems to show that we are already well on the way to just that change in constitutional practice, and without the aid of constitutional amendment.

Yet another reform which Mr. Hazlitt advocates is the creation of a legislative council comprising members of both houses of Congress and of both the principal parties, and the submission to this body in the first instance of all important legislative proposals. An approximation to this commendably constructive suggestion is at this very moment being urged by certain members of Congress, and might easily carry with some encouragement from the White House. It is interesting to note, in further demonstration of what is possible under the Constitution as it exists today, that there is nothing to prevent a President from choosing his Cabinet from the membership of such a legislative council instead of, as today, from the heads of the great administrative departments.

The revolutionary program which Mr. Hazlitt wrote his book primarily to urge will hardly come about until constitutional practice under the present system shall have better paved the way for it, and in thus paving the way constitutional practice may render the more drastic change unnecessary. Meanwhile, Mr. Hazlitt has done a service in inviting his countrymen, or the section of them whose consideration of such things matters, to try to take some thought of our constitutional morrow. Once the war is won the need of doing this will be even more apparent than it is today.

I must add a word about the index. Its helpfulness is illustrated by the fact that under *P* "Pearl Harbor" is cited to five different passages in the book, while the word "President" is not even listed! EDWARD S. CORWIN

Asides and Diversions

NOTE BOOKS OF NIGHT. By Edmund Wilson. San Francisco: The Colt Press. \$2.50.

IT IS to be expected that any book by Edmund Wilson will prove interesting, and "Note Books of Night," a handsomely printed volume from the Colt Press of San Francisco, does not disappoint such an expectation. The book, as its title suggests, is a miscellany, the literary asides and diversions, as it were, of a man whose central preoccupation is criticism, literary and social. We find here serious verse, satirical pieces in both verse and prose, parodies, two items which seem to be excerpts from a journal of travel, two others which are memories of the author's childhood, and one rather short prose piece, *The Moon in a Dream*, which is difficult to classify. The book, by its very nature, has no central line; we have here glimpses and snapshots, informal or intimate, of the critic whose public appearances have usually been of an entirely different and more reserved

temper. This means that a number of the snapshots are of interest to us because we have a prior, and more substantial, interest in the public appearances. In other words, part of our interest here is derivative and secondary, and the reader's concern, upon reflection, may be to distinguish the secondary from the primary interests in "Note Books of Night."

The serious verse is of uneven quality. In pieces like *Provincetown*, 1936, we find a sober, meticulous descriptive poetry which in *The Crows of March* achieves a considerable degree of vividness. In the pieces which are more subjective, such as *The Voice or Home to Town*, there are patches of very conventional and sentimental writing. For example:

I heard it, dulled with love upon your breast,
I heard it in our peace of summer suns;
I heard it when the long waves of the West
Retard the dark with loud suspended guns.

Or:

And all the city love, intense and faint like you—
The little drooping breasts, the cigarettes,
The little cunning shadow between narrow thighs.
They will get rid of cities—
They will make themselves better bodies—
But they will never have a girl so pale and blue-veined and
quick and passionate as you.

In the first example, the image of the last two lines seems to be mere rhetorical decoration, only vaguely related to the business in hand, and the first two lines, in both phrase and rhythm, are merely conventional. The second example, I think, is equally conventional; only the convention has been changed from an old one to a new one. With two exceptions, *The Crows of March* and *Night in May*, the serious poems strike me as of secondary interest.

Some of the pieces of satirical verse, such as *Chorus of Stalin's Yes-Men*, are tied to vanished occasions, and their pungency has largely evaporated with the passage of even a little time. *Disloyal Lines to an Alumnus* who "complained in the *Alumni Weekly* that books by alumni authors were not being sufficiently praised by the reviews of that periodical" is high-grade farce; and "The Omelet of A. MacLeish," which is already well known, is a brilliant combination of parody and criticism and butchery. Both of these pieces will be fun for everybody except Struthers Burt and Archibald MacLeish, the two luckless gentlemen involved. In the prose section, *The Three Limperary Cripples* provides the fun, a Joycean satire on the New York literary scene.

All of the pieces in the prose section are expert, though now and then the expertness is a little too self-conscious, verging toward preciousness. For example, there is the last paragraph of *Return from Louisiana*, or this sentence from *Variations on a Landscape*: ". . . though the day was still luminous and full, it held already the tragic suggestion of the encroachments of the winter darkness which was clipping it closer every night." But I think that one can have little but praise for *Variations* and *At Laurelwood*, the pieces which seem to be parts of an autobiography. It is only to be hoped that these are not mere fragments but are parts of a work in progress. If there is such a work and if these are fair samples, then it will be a book of great distinction.

ROBERT PENN WARREN

Epstein as Temperament and Artist

THE ART OF JACOB EPSTEIN. By Robert Black. The World Publishing Company. \$3.50.

THOUGH his "Adam" provoked a customary uproar as recently as 1939 and became a kind of touring circus attraction in England and America, the scandalous interest of Epstein's work has now receded sufficiently to permit a reasonable view of his talent. Such attention has in the past been as much obstructed by the sculptor's deliberate shock tactics and instability among his media as by alternating public excesses of prurient indignation and partisan apology. When a more astute criticism has approached his total achievement, it has tended to wariness or censorious contempt. The summary verdict of an American book on sculpture thirteen years ago—"In the last analysis Epstein is a good showman of negligible artistic interest"—is typical. This is scarcely reasonable. The exhibitionism implicit in Epstein's bolder conceptions does have an artistic interest, not only in relation to his own serious claims but with respect to the various efforts of modern sculptors to recover, at whatever expense of taste or erratic experimentation, the monumental quality and motivation which recent architecture has never really succeeded in encouraging in their art as a means of raising it from its fallen dignity as studio, museum, or minor social craftsmanship.

Epstein's long line of large-scale works, beginning with the Strand Statues in 1907, though the Wilde monument at Père Lachaise, the "Christ," "Consummatum Est," "Behold the Man," "Genesis," the Underground Building fig-

ures, "Primeval Man," the Hudson Memorial "Rima," and the "Adam," represent this effort at its most strenuous. Admittedly, it would take a greater plastic and structural power than Epstein has ever shown to harmonize this violence with anything recognizable as a subtle and precise sensibility. The sensibility—conceptual or poetic as well as structural—which men as different as Rodin, Maillol, Despiau, Lachaise, and Gaudier maintained or even enhanced in their larger works has always suffered when Epstein essayed the heroic or grandiose. The hiatus that exists between his early abstractions and his later portrait heads, and that reappears between these heads and his public monuments, is partially bridged by a certain consistency of temperament and vision but not by a fundamental unity of style or formal insight. This discontinuity in his talent may be partly explained, as Mr. Black hints, by the sculptor's divergence between his favorite pursuit of elemental forms and the practical requirements of portrait modeling. But it also ensues from the fact that he has been divided between a racial tendency toward religious, cultural, or ethnic abstraction and a personal, temperamental taste for character-reading and intimate emotion: between abstractions and images; between heroic or mythic symbolism and social naturalism. This contrast appears at once if one places the "Rima" or the "Adam" against the portraits of Einstein, Conrad, Shaw, Priestley, Hulme, and the Duke of Marlborough.

The "Rima," deriving from the Ludovisi Throne Aphrodite in design and rhythmic organization, and the "Adam," with its totem-like animism suggestive of Semitic and Egyptian ikon forms, represent an almost galvanic disturbance—less spontaneous than arbitrary—of the formal stasis which Epstein offered in an early abstraction like "Two Doves" or "Mother and Child" or in the recalcitrant "Sun God." Between these extremes is the simpler yet more compelling formal sincerity of the early Strand Statues, but that sincerity he seems to have sacrificed quite willingly for the monumental and symbolic eloquence which he hardly mastered in any genuine sense. In the first "Christ" figure, a beautifully intense realism and dramatic power quicken a basically inert columnar design. This seldom reappears in the later massive works. These show little of the nervous force that Gaudier—or Rodin or Maillol, for that matter—released from his larger blocks. They depend too greatly, for values both of structure and of symbolism, on the degree to which they derive from traditionally sacred subjects and primitive racial phantoms to take on the free life of created forms—this separating them also from the work of more single-minded abstractionists like Henry Moore.

His portrait work took Epstein into a truer personal element. Here he mastered a genuine emotion of character and society, something not only far beyond the hack fidelity of a Jo Davidson but stronger in its essential plasticity than the purer impressionism of Lehmbruch or Kolbe. Yet even here Epstein required an amenable type, a head adaptable to the hieratic stylization which alone sustains the heavily volcanic and instrumented surfaces which he cultivated to the point of mannerism. Such types as Shaw, Boas, Dewey, Einstein, MacDonald, and—ridiculously—Priestley amount either to caricatures or to sentimentalizations in his hands. But subjects like Van Dieren, Conrad, Hulme, Robeson,

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Cunninghame Graham, Jacob Kramer, Lady Gregory, Old Pinager, and—superbly—Marlborough invited the abstracting of mask-forms or racial types, and led to that balancing of individual traits with social or ethnic references that makes a sculptural portrait succeed. When Epstein pursued this balance to the point of making a head impersonal—as in the renderings of Nan, Dolores, Meum, Mrs. Epstein, and the baroque *putti*—he gave his excessive stylism a classic stamp and serenity, controlled, delicate, beautifully memorable. Here his fault of sacrificing the integrity of his forms to a species of explosive dynamism—a flaying of the clay which Rodin never risked, even when he was reacting most strongly against the runny suavities and *art nouveau* element that haunted his salon style—is subdued; the contours of his design take on their finest lightness and luminosity; a poetic archaism to compare with Despiau's or Maillol's, and well beyond the pedantry of Manship, Bourdelle, and Gill, arrives to give Epstein's work its subtlest point and beauty.

The problem of Epstein's work is the problem of personality. He presents one of the best cases among modern artists for the discipline of a superabundant energy and temperament by plastic and historical principles. Only when he arrives at the true balance of these elements does he produce work that is likely to endure. Incidentally, this problem was intelligently submitted and objectified by Epstein himself in his recent autobiography, "Let There Be Sculpture." It is *not* so submitted, discussed, or in any way intelligently dealt with in the present volume. The text is as inept an exposition as has appeared in any recent book of this sort, where the curator style's dullest ceremonies are the rule. The photographs are of all kinds, mostly museum prints, showing no control or appropriateness of lighting. Dimensions of the works are lacking; the works are not arranged in any apparent sequence; important sculptures like the "Genesis," "Consummatum Est," and most of the Strand Statues, though mentioned, are not among the plates; "Behold the Man" is shown only in what appears to be a newspaper print; errors in spelling are frequent; the catalogue of Epstein's works has several garbled passages. The format and price of the book are attractive, but it is a model neither of the historical survey nor of the critical treatment to which Epstein and his public are entitled.

MORTON DAUWEN ZABEL

The Middle Ground

THE TECHNIQUES OF DEMOCRACY. By Alfred M. Bingham. Duell, Sloan, and Pearce. \$3.

ALFRED BINGHAM'S various studies of political and economic problems have won him an increasing respect among students who are not too bound to dogma to appreciate his unorthodox approach to the problems of modern democracy. His new book is a fresh elaboration of his general thesis that modern society is not confronted with simple "either-or" choices between collectivism and freedom. He is looking for a middle ground between a collectivism which would solve all problems by bringing economic life completely under political control and a *laissez faire* theory which equates democracy with unregulated economic enterprise.

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Free Churchill Pamphlet

The new Archbishop of Canterbury was appointed by Prime Minister Winston Churchill against the wishes of Tory reactionaries in Britain. A huge audience in the Albert Hall, London, heard the Archbishop declare for transference of taxes from production equipment to ground values. (See *Christian Century*, October 7, 1942.) Churchill himself, in a volume recently issued in New York, says: "Who could have thought that it would be easier to produce by toil and skill all the most necessary or desirable commodities than it is to find consumers for them? It is certain that the economic problem with which we are now confronted is not adequately solved, indeed is not solved at all, by the teachings of the textbooks, however grand may be their logic, however illustrious may be their authors." Churchill is also for the taxation of ground rental values.

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Bingham is convinced that the "negative" state which acts only as an umpire in the economic sphere is a thing of the past, and that the totalitarian powers gained an advantage over us by their ability to act quickly and efficiently, not only in issues immediately related to the war, but in the organization of economic life. However, they could not do this without destroying all of the essential freedoms of democracy. He therefore rightly regards the problem of leadership as the paramount problem of democracy. The question is how the processes of democratic life can be given more adequate direction, how democratic action can be made more decisive, how political and economic processes can be synthesized and confusion and cross-purposes avoided, without unduly centralizing authority or making power irresponsible.

In answering that question he examines all the "techniques" of political and economic life—the relation of the executive to the legislative branch of government, the tendencies toward centralization and decentralization in both government and industry, and the necessities and limits of political control over economic life. He has great confidence in the possibilities of a scientific management in industry which learns how to gain "power with men" rather than "power over men." What he has to say upon this issue is usually wise and discriminating, though one wonders whether he fully recognizes the perennial character of the frictions and tensions that would exist in even the best possible democratic society.

Mr. Bingham's confidence in the efficacy of self-regulation in industry does not lead him to any uncritical espousal of

"free enterprise." He wants a positive rather than "do-nothing" state. He believes in "strategic" planning in order to prevent confusion in the economic sphere. Yet he would maintain the automatic balances and disciplines of the "free market" within the framework of strategic planning, convinced that no bureaucratic prevision is wise enough to anticipate all the complexities of economic life which are encountered and resolved in the free market. But Mr. Bingham disagrees with most of his colleagues in this school of thought in his approach to unions. He believes in the union shop. He regards the security for the union which it establishes as a "constitutional framework" for its effective function in the democracy of industry and sees no essential distinction between compulsory dues and compulsory taxation in political society. Mr. Bingham is, in other words, a wise and prudent guide amid the perplexities of our day, looking for a "middle way" with great sincerity and freedom from prejudice.

When he goes beyond the problem of "techniques" and discusses the underlying presuppositions of democracy he is not equally convincing. He thinks that democracy was "born in the Age of Reason," forgetting that Anglo-Saxon democracy was born not in the eighteenth but in the seventeenth century, in the age not of reason but of warring faiths, and rested upon the beneficent discovery that no point of view was so true and no claim to authority in the community so plausible as to have the right to maintain itself without allowing competing points of view to challenge it.

It is true, as he avers, that Nazi totalitarianism is based upon unreason. But Communist totalitarianism is based upon faith in reason, that is, upon the faith that reason can be purged of all ideological taint, of all class corruptions, and become absolutely pure. If this should be possible, if it should really be true that the proletarian perspective is the only untainted approach to social issues, it becomes quite logical to seek the suppression of all dissident points of view as being *ipso facto* "corrupted" by capitalist corruption. Democracy does, indeed, require some faith in man's rational capacity and moral inclination to consider interests other than his own. But it also rests upon a shrewd understanding of the corruption of interest in all points of view and the consequent necessity of allowing to no one a position of immunity to the challenge of opposition. If human nature is as good as Mr. Bingham thinks it is, he ought not to be so concerned as he seems to be to make power responsible and to check it with other forms of power. In that case we would merely have to look for Plato's philosopher-king and trust the purity of his reason to control his power.

A rather interesting example of Mr. Bingham's own rational optimism may be found in his discussion of international affairs. He thinks that "so long as there is a machine-gun anywhere in the world—outside of a museum—it is a permanent denial of the democratic belief in the dignity of man. . . . If the world community is to have a future it must shift from the rule of force to the rule of law." It must certainly shift from the rule of force without law. But can Mr. Bingham offer any examples in history of a rule of law without force, or any plausible reason for believing that life could ever be sufficiently devitalized to make law self-enforcing?

REINHOLD NIEBUHR

AMUSEMENTS

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DRAMA

As It Was in the Beginning

THE SKIN OF OUR TEETH," Thornton Wilder's new play now current at the Plymouth, is said to have been enthusiastically rejected by many of the old-line producers. Most of them had probably been busy for a decade or more turning down other impressionistic, expressionistic, and non-representational plays, and none of them had had many occasions to regret his decisions—for old-line producers are not accustomed to lose much sleep when they discover that they have missed an opportunity to sponsor what the more adventurous critics find it possible to call "an interesting experiment." But "The Skin of Our Teeth" is an interesting experiment by any producer's definition. A few nights after it opened in New York the S. R. O. sign was out, and patrons were hanging over the rail at the rear of the auditorium. Something which looked to the best judges like a perfect example of what closes Saturday night, something which provoked audiences in the try-out towns to demand their money back, was, in Broadway's own language, a smash hit.

No doubt the personal following of Tallulah Bankhead and the delightful performance she is giving have something to do with the phenomenon. So, too, have the lesser but real followings of Fredric March and Florence Eldridge, the fine performances of all the large cast, which includes Florence Reed in a beautifully executed bit, and also Elia Kazan's skilful execution of a terribly difficult directorial job. But all these put together would certainly not serve if the public did not like the play, and yet that play is one by comparison with which most of the "interesting experiments" in stagecraft and dramatic method would look like mere pieces of timid sardouledom. Meyerhold and Piscator, putting their heads together in the late twenties, could hardly have done such violence to conventional dramatic form. And yet the whole wild project comes off with astonishing success.

Mr. Wilder's story is concerned with nothing less than the History of Mankind as represented by the adventures of Mr. Antrobus and his family, whose story includes, among other things, the coming of the great Ice Age, Noah's flood, and all the great wars including the present one. Mr. Wilder's thesis is merely that from the beginning of time

Mr. Antrobus's existence has been a series of indescribable calamities from which he has managed, at the last minute and quite improbably, to escape by the skin of his teeth. Between calamities he grows unbelievably careless, improvident, and complacent. He pays no attention to the signs which are as plain as the nose on his face. But, then, when it is obviously too late it turns out to be really all but just that. Most of his companions perish in water or ice or gunpowder. His home is destroyed, his civilization all but forgotten. And then, at last, when the waters have receded or the fighters have all killed one another, Mr. Antrobus crawls back, raises the walls of his house once more, and drags up out of the cellar the tattered remains of the books, in which some thoughts to begin again with have remained legible. So it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be, world without end—unless of course Mr. Antrobus has been learning more than there seems any good reason for believing he has.

Now it is obvious that the history of mankind hardly fits very conveniently into the framework of the well-made play. But Mr. Wilder has made his problem easier by first making it harder. To tell the story chronologically as a series of eternally recurrent events would make it not only endless but also intolerably repetitious. Since it really is the same thing happening over and over again, why not tell the story not in time but in eternity, why not assume that all the ice ages, all the floods, and all the wars happened together? Accordingly when we first meet the Antrobuses they are living in a suburban house in New Jersey; but it is also at the time of the great Ice Age, and Mr. Antrobus, though, he works in a New York office and sends his wife singing telegrams, has also just invented the wheel—thereby practically completing the art of mechanics—and is finishing up the alphabet. Accordingly, also, Noah's flood catches him some thousands of years later during one of those periods of silliness between calamities when he has just been elected president of the Fraternal Order of Mammals and is celebrating at Atlantic City. And similarly, the great war which is just concluding at the end of the last act is all wars at once. The troublesome son with a scar on his forehead can hardly be other than Cain; but he also talks remarkably like Hitler.

Doubtless all this sounds quite impossible as a play, but I can only assure


you that it isn't and note, for example, one little incident: the disregarded storm warning on the beach which flashes "storm," "hurricane," and finally "end of the world" while no one notices it is as effective as anything I have seen on the stage in a long, long time. One naturally wonders why Mr. Wilder has been so triumphantly successful with a method which has so seldom got beyond the "interesting experiment" stage—at least since Aristophanes, who did, after all, precede Meyerhold and the Federal Theater, last used it. Possibly one answer has something to do with the fact that Mr. Wilder has given it a more imaginative, less merely neurotic, tone than most of the Russian or German experimenters. In any event he has somehow managed to be always serious but never solemn and has kept the whole, though grimly and ironically humorous, humorous nevertheless. And to one who has always held to the old-fashioned idea that art must please if it is to be art at all, it is a very gratifying fact that "The Skin of Our Teeth" pleases quite as much as it admonishes or instructs.

After such a play a merely well-made drama including nothing more exciting

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THE *World*

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than the capture of a German spy and an air raid on the New England coast is no doubt bound to seem pretty tame. In any event "Yankee Point" (Longacre Theater), despite very competent if very conventional writing, and despite the pleasing presence of Edna Best and John Cromwell, does seem less than world-shaking. Perhaps the fact that not the spy or the air raid but the performance of Elizabeth Patterson as a cantankerously comic old lady got most favorable attention from the critics means something.

JOSEPH WOOD KRUTCH

RECORDS

Outstanding Releases of 1942

[V stands for Victor; C for Columbia; O for Okeh; D for Decca.]

Bach: Sonata No. 3 for violin and piano; Yehudi and Hephzibah Menuhin (imperfect performance); V Set 887, \$2.63.

Beethoven: Quartet Op. 135; Budapest Quartet (badly recorded); C Set 489, \$3.68. Quartet Op. 95; Budapest Quartet (poorly recorded); C Set 519, \$3.68. Quartet Op. 59 No. 3; Budapest Quartet (badly recorded); C Set 510, \$4.73. Quartet Op. 59 No. 2; Coolidge Quartet; V Set 919, \$4.73. Grand Fugue Op. 133; Busch Chamber Players; C Set X-221, \$2.63. Sonata Op. 47 ("Kreutzer") for violin and piano; Busch and Serkin; C Set 496, \$4.73. Sonata Op. 5 No. 1 for cello and piano—only for Casals's performance with Horszowski; V Set 843, \$3.68. Sonata Op. 81a for piano; Artur Schnabel (performance a little Chopinesque); V Set 858, \$2.63. Variations Op. 35 ("Eroica") and Op. 34 for piano; Arrau; V Set 892, \$4.73. Symphony No. 8; Toscanini and N.B.C. Symphony; V Set 908, \$3.68.

Berlioz: Symphonie Fantastique; Rodzinski and Cleveland Orchestra (rattly and gritty with light pickups); C Set 488, \$6.83.

Brabms: Symphony No. 2; Weingartner and London Philharmonic; C Set 493, \$5.78. Symphony No. 1—only for Toscanini's performance with the N. B. C. Symphony; V Set 875, \$5.78. Trio Op. 8 for piano, violin, and cello—only for the Rubinstein-Heifetz-Feuermann performance (recording afflicted with occasional rattles); V Set 883, \$4.73.

Chabrier: Trois Valses romantiques; Gaby and Robert Casadesus (perfunctory performance, rattly recording); C Set X-209, \$2.63.

Chopin: Etudes Op. 25; Kilenyi (performances fair, recording occasionally not clear); C Set 473, \$3.68.

Debussy: "Iberia"; Reiner and Pittsburgh Symphony (recording enveloped in acoustic deadness and occasionally incorrect in volume level); C Set 491, \$3.68.

Dvorák: Quartet Op. 51; Busch Quartet; C Set 480, \$4.73.

Fauré: Requiem; Pelletier and Montreal Festivals Orchestra, etc.; V Set 844, \$5.78.

Franck: Symphony—for Beecham's performance with the London Philharmonic (C Set 479, \$5.78) or Monteux's with the San Francisco Symphony (V Set 840, \$5.78).

Glück: "Che puro ciel" and "Che faro senza Euridice" from "Orfeo ed Euridice"; Risé Stevens; C 71365-D, \$1.05.

Hajdu: Quartet Op. 54 No. 1; Budapest Quartet; V Set 869, \$2.63.

Mendelssohn: Music for "Midsummer Night's Dream"; Rodzinski and Cleveland Orchestra; C Set 504, \$4.73.

Mozart: Symphony K.504 ("Prague"); Beecham and London Philharmonic; C Set 509, \$3.68. Quintet in G minor for strings; Budapest Quartet (poorly recorded); C Set 526, \$4.73. Sonatas K.576 and 283 for piano; Arrau; V Set 842, \$3.68. Agnus Dei from Mass in C minor; Pelletier and Montreal Festivals Orchestra, etc.; V 18512, \$1.05. "Deh vieni non tardar" from "The Marriage of Figaro" (with "Caro nome" from Verdi's "Rigoletto"); Sayao; V 18496 \$1.05.

Mussorgsky: "Pictures at an Exhibition" for piano; Brailovsky (poor performance); V Set 861, \$4.73. "Within Four Walls" from "Sunless" cycle; Robeson; C 71367-D, \$1.05.

Rossini: Abridged version of "The Barber of Seville"; Bamboschek and Reggiani, Ramirez, Landi, etc. (uneven singing); V Set 898, \$8.93.

Schubert: Quintet in C major for strings; Budapest Quartet and B. Heifetz (badly recorded); C Set 497, \$6.83. Trio Op. 99 for piano, violin, and cello; Rubinstein, Heifetz, and Feuermann; V Set 923, \$4.73. Rondo Op. 70 for violin and piano; Yehudi and Hephzibah Menuhin; V Set 901, \$2.63. Sonata Op. 53 for piano; Artur Schnabel (uneven performance); V Set 888, \$5.78.

Schumann: "Dichterliebe" cycle; Lehmann and Bruno Walter (poorly recorded); C Set 486, \$4.20. Symphony No. 4; Walter and London Symphony; V Set 837, \$3.68.

Sibelius: Symphony No. 5; Rodzinski and Cleveland Orchestra (recording weak in bass); C Set 514, \$4.73.

Smetana: "Die Moldau"; Walter and New York Philharmonic-Symphony (recording not clean); C Set X-211, \$2.63.

Strauss, Johann: "Du und du" from "Die Fledermaus," and "Liebeslieder" and "Morgenblätter" Waltzes; Krauss, Kleiber, the Vienna Philharmonic; V Set 907, \$3.68. "Kaiserwalzer"; Walter and New York Philharmonic-Symphony; C 11854-D, \$1.05.

Tchaikovsky: Piano Concerto No. 1—for the performance of Toscanini with Horowitz and the N.B.C. Symphony (badly recorded); V Set 800, \$4.73.

Verdi: Duet from Act 1, Willow Song, and Ave Maria from "Otello"; Lemnitz and Ralf (sung in German); V Set 860, \$2.63. "Dio mi potevi scagliar" and "Niun mi

tema" from "Otello"; Melchior; C 71389-D, \$1.05.

Vivaldi: Concerto Grosso Op. 3 No. 11 (arranged by Siloti); Koussevitzky and Boston Symphony; V Set 886, \$2.63.

Wagner: Dawn, Rhine Journey, Siegfried's Death from "Die Götterdämmerung"—only for Toscanini's performance with the N. B. C. Symphony; V Set 853, \$3.68. Prelude to Act 3, Dance of the Apprentices, Procession of the Mastersingers from "Die Meistersinger"; Reiner and Pittsburgh Symphony; C Set X-218, \$2.63. "O König" from "Tristan und Isolde" (with the Prayer from "Rienzi"); Melchior; C 71388-D, \$1.05.

JAZZ: REISSUES

Louis Armstrong (with Earl Hines at the piano, 1927 and 1928): "West End Blues" and "Muggles"; C 36377.

Johnny Dodds: "Melancholy"; D 3864.

Jimmy Noone: "I Know That You Know" and Danny Polo: "Blue Murder"; D 3863.

JAZZ: NEW ISSUES

Sidney Bechet: "Texas Moaner"; V 27690. "Rose Room"; V 27707.

Allen-Higginbotham Orchestra: "Indiana"; O 6357.

Cootie Williams: "West End Blues"; O 6370.

Add to these one of the great sets of the year, just issued by Victor: Beethoven's Piano Concerto No. 4, played by Artur Schnabel with the Chicago Symphony under Stock (Set 930, \$4.73). The work is one of Beethoven's greatest; Schnabel's performance of the solo part remains incomparable; the orchestral part is admirably integrated with it; and the performance is reproduced with marvelously life-like fidelity and spaciousness, though with a weakness in the lower range that is evident, for example, in the sound of the solo cello accompanying the piano's first entrance in the finals, and in the lack of body and power in the bass of the piano throughout. The surfaces of my review copy are not as quiet as they should be; and a couple of them swish and scrape noisily.

This is a set to acquire if you haven't Schnabel's older one; if you have the older one hold on to it. Schnabel's playing in the new one, as I have said, is incomparable—except with his playing in the old one, in which there are even more wonderful contours and inflections of phrase, and these are produced with beautiful clarity and perfection of execution, as against his occasional blurring on the new records, his bad fumbles in the bass in the second movement. Moreover, the old performance is reproduced with astonishing fidelity, clarity, and balance, even if it hasn't the additional liveness and sharpness which the extended range of the recording gives to the sound of the new performance, and doesn't sound spaced out as in the concert hall but sounds compressed into a phonograph.

B. H. HAGGIN

Letters to the Editors

Needed: a Second Party

Dear Sirs: Much talk was heard in the last campaign, as in previous ones, about our two-party system of government. But nothing in history is a greater hoax than the assumption that "our system" of government is based on the existence of two parties only. The fact is that our two major parties, left to their own devices, would be content to behave merely as "ins" and "outs," with the "ins" dividing the spoils. Every major reform movement that has swept this country in the past has had its origin in a third party, not in either of the two major parties.

Examination of the issues raised by the Democrats and Republicans in previous campaigns shows that the standard bearer of the "outs" resorts to high-sounding phrases without introducing any ideas which differ basically from those of the opposition. Not until the appearance of Franklin D. Roosevelt with his New Deal did the Democratic Party present a program radically different from that of the Republicans. And the New Deal policies of the President did not at first get the full support of the Democratic Party. Most of the party hacks looked askance at the White House with its new-fangled theories of social legislation, of reform, and of sound international policies. They did not interpret Roosevelt's Administration as a new concept of government replacing Hooverism. To them, Roosevelt merely substituted a Democratic Administration for a Republican Administration.

The party that is out of power always cultivates leadership; the more articulate the spokesman, the better the party bosses like him, provided, of course, they believe they can manipulate him. Should they suspect that he is getting out of hand and may actually believe what he is saying, the chances of his being nominated are materially reduced. In time of peace such a routine could be tolerated and the country could muddle along in a hit-or-miss way. In a time of national emergency such methods are too costly.

Few persons understand that we have not had a two-party system of government but a one-party system, with the party divided into two sections. There

is room for a second party—a party that would give expression to the needs of the people. We need a party that will take the tenets of the New Deal and broaden them out and apply them. We need a party that will cut across superficial party lines, shake off the spoils system, and begin to think in terms of the present needs of our country, which has to wage a war and win a peace. Such a party must not be tied in any way to corrupt politicians without vision, courage, or program. The bosses know only one thing, and that is that their ward-healers have to be placated. They cannot produce national or international leadership; their kind of political immaturity cannot be tolerated in this critical period.

Independent, clear-thinking citizens in all walks of life, regardless of what political labels they inherited from their parents, should begin to think as mature citizens of a leading nation of this world who have to plan and mold a future civilization. Liberals should make common cause with organized labor and the underprivileged, and all of these together should build a party that will carry out a constructive program for our nation.

MURRAY GROSS

New York, November 25

Nedich Is Hitler's Man

Dear Sirs: With the United Nations in control of most of North Africa, the Balkan states may again become a major battlefield. Hitler has sent reinforcements to Thrace, Dalmatia, and the Aegean coast; on our side experts are looking for invasion areas that offer possibilities from both the military and the political point of view. The Balkans, thanks largely to the people of Yugoslavia, whose guerrilla army has been in the field for a year and a half, may prove to be the most suitable place for a Continental second front.

In the light of this it is curious that a campaign to furbish up the reputation of General Milan Nedich, the Serbian Quisling, has recently begun in the American press. It started when the French journalist André Geraud, who uses the nom de plume Pertinax, wrote a story for the North American Newspaper Alliance hailing Nedich's "patri-

otism and heroism." Later, in a series of articles in the *New York Times*, Hanson Baldwin, the military analyst, said, on what authority it is hard to guess, that "the Nedich government in puppet Serbia is classified by those who know it as a Pétain, not a Quisling, government." Ray Brock, *New York Times* correspondent in Ankara, and several other journalists and speakers have sought in one way or another to justify or condone Nedich and his regime.

Precisely why Mr. Baldwin or anyone else believes that it is better to be a Pétain than a Quisling. I cannot imagine. As a matter of fact, it might be argued that there is more moral integrity in an outright Quisling than in a Pétain. In any case, the fact is that the free and democratic government of Yugoslavia in London has put General Nedich on its list of pro-Axis criminals who should be tried after the war. Every report reaching Yugoslavian émigrés in this country indicates that General Nedich has been the Führer's faithful servant ever since he was made puppet governor of Serbia last year. And there is nothing to indicate that his role has since changed.

NICHOLAS MIRKOVICH

New York, November 24

What Is the Opposition Doing?

Dear Sirs: The stifled voice of one of the great standard bearers for freedom has knelled in my ears for the past several weeks. Ever since Juan Negrín's message on Free Spain appeared in *The Nation* of October 17 I have been expecting an editorial, or better still an explanatory article from an authoritative source, which would explain his position in terms of the aims of liberty which we—and he—serve. Why must he write, "Let us devote ourselves to that [winning the war] and advise all our friends to do the same, serving where we can even if our collaboration is not asked for or is even avoided"; and then again, "The government [the last-elected Republican government] cannot, without abusing the hospitality that it is obliged to enjoy, act through its own proper apparatus in a way that is adequate to the political needs of Spain"?

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Is the stature of a Negrín so small, were his contributions so scanty, that he can be overlooked? Who avoids Juan Negrín and calls himself a fighter for freedom? Worse still, for this avoidance comes from high places, what peace can be expected from these world planners who have not the wit to want the collaboration of this great statesman? Is, then, Spain, lost? Truly lost? Have "current attempts to restore the monarchy through diplomatic action" (I quote J. Alvarez del Vayo) been so successful that men high in the administrative offices of the United Nations find "the liberation of Spain and the reestablishment of the legal institutions which the nation created" (Negrín) the purpose of an enemy alien?

Not even burning indignation against treatment so callous would have led me to ask those questions if it were not for the encouraging "Reunion on the Left" described by Ralph Bates in your issue of October 31. Perhaps he or a Tom Wintringham can tell us what the Labor-Liberal opposition opposes—for Negrín cables from London. What, concretely, is the opposition doing to purify the high places? Does it supervise at all the relationships of the official government with the governments-in-exile? Does it attempt to influence the Foreign Office in its selection, recommendation, approval, or disapproval of members of these governments? Does it realize that after the war is over these governments will be in a position to secure great gifts of power within their national areas of jurisdiction? Is the democratic opposition in Great Britain cognizant of the fact that without generous labor and liberal representation within each government-in-exile, such gifts of power can easily become the arrogated privileges of new reactionary regimes on the Continent? Surely the Labor Party must realize that "when the post-war crisis inevitably arrives, the old parties and the trade

unions must once again become instruments of protest. If they do not, the movement for reform will collapse, and we shall sink into despair" (Ralph Bates in the article cited).

The current of victory runs strong. An Allied thrust over the Mediterranean, with bridgeheads in Greece and the promise of an Italian invasion, may quickly overrun the Balkans and beat upon the gates of Central Europe. Greece, which bled for democracy, Albania, which was sacrificed, Yugoslavia, which still fights, Bulgaria, Italy itself where the anti-freedom curse first fell, will need governments and administrators. Shall there be kings again, and potentates?

Could there be arranged an article, perhaps in the Political War section of your journal, dealing with the factual endeavors and concrete proposals of Labor and Liberal voices and with their influence on the foreign offices and programs of the major governments-in-exile? Many people would like to know what measures are being taken by the only free labor movements left in Europe to defeat the kind of diplomacy that is laying the groundwork for World War III.

ARNOLD GISNET

Harrisburg, Pa., November 18

Memorial for Dr. Carver

Dear Sirs: Acquisition of the birthplace of the famous Negro scientist Dr. George Washington Carver of Tuskegee as the first federal memorial for any member of his race is called for by a bill now before the Public Lands Committees in both houses of Congress. Liberals all over the United States are being asked to help get the bills reported for a vote as a Christmas offering of good-will to our colored citizens.

Surely Dr. Carver's spectacular rise from slavery over every imaginable obstacle to become the creator of the new science of chemurgy, the founder of the now vital peanut-oil industry, and the "inventor of Ersatz" long before Hitler misused that science of substitutes should entitle him and his people to such a memorial.

This measure has been indorsed by both the N. A. A. C. P. and its Southern critics. Enthusiasm for it has been found even in the South, where the peanut crop this year is valued at half a billion dollars. We hope that Americans everywhere will rally behind a bill so expressive of war-time unity and racial good-will.

RICHARD PILANT

St. Louis, Mo., November 25

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